By Rebecca Grant, Defense Opinion Writer.
In these tight budget times, some members of the U.S. Senate would dearly love to raise $100 billion for the U.S. Treasury by auctioning off portions of the broadcast spectrum where military radars operate.
There’s just one problem: no analysis has yet proven that the new auction of the spectrum, known as lower S-band, won’t impair vital military systems, now and into the future. Done wrong, an auction could disable some of America’s most advanced capabilities. President Donald J. Trump’s “Golden Dome” initiative might be affected, along with numerous other systems.
The electromagnetic spectrum is vital real estate for keeping America safe from missile attacks. As Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., said at hearings last month, “If we lose the spectrum war, we lose the war.”
To recap, the risk comes from a potential spectrum auction that would clear or compress a specific area of spectrum known as S-band. Specifically, putting the 3.1 to 3.5 gigahertz band on the chopping block could be disastrous because vital military radars operate in that exact frequency range.
This portion of S-band has unique physical properties, making it the “sweet spot,” combining a longer tracking range with efficient power. And it’s nearly impervious to weather. This is why the U.S. military operates a vital array of radars in S-band for tracking incoming enemy aircraft and missiles. For similar reasons, commercial 5G providers are pounding on the door, eager for access to the same slice of S-band.
Everybody wants more 5G for videos, and commercial providers are pushing hard for the government to auction off new portions of the spectrum. Potential solutions involving lower power-sharing may be a way forward.
Three approaches are on the table
First is clearing the lower S-band spectrum for exclusive use by commercial 5G companies. Forget about that approach. Kicking out military radars and redesigning them would leave the U.S. homeland blind and open to attack. The threats from China, Russia, North Korea, etc. wait while new radars are built. There’s no point in raising tens of billions of dollars at auction if the costs to modify and replace military radars tops $250 billion.
For the Senate, the temptation has grown so strong that there is now discussion of ways to “share” the spectrum between the military and commercial companies.
Second is the salami approach, which involves sharing the S-band slice by slice, dedicating small slices to commercial users, while the military keeps other slices. This is risky, too. One thing is for certain: 5G can’t have exclusive access to key portions of S-band. Radars were carefully designed to operate across the full reach of the spectrum band. Commercial users blasting out high power for videos, even in small slices, could prevent military radars from operating across the entire lower S-band to detect incoming missile warheads.
But for the moment, there’s no definitive study proving it is safe to cram 5G into the same cubby hole as military radars. No senior Pentagon official is going to sign off on any spectrum reallocation until the physics can be proven to work to the satisfaction of the warfighters.
Especially since President Trump has tasked Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to produce an “Iron Dome” missile shield concept for the U.S. That’s going to take a lot of radars, and the Pentagon needs to be able to count on its radars operating in the lower S-band to defend America, now and in the future.
The third approach is to put limits on the power levels for commercial operators. Since high-power 5G creates big risks, lower-power sharing could be attractive. Most of the growing consumer demand is for video, which accounts for about 73% of demand. Streaming videos from mobile devices like phones consumes much more bandwidth than Google web searches or phone calls.
Social media applications add another 9%. However, research shows what you already know: most of those applications are used indoors, where power demands are lower. For example, a smart factory floor operation runs on a private network built by the company that is designed to use low power, since routers are close by. This so-called “indoor power” sharing across 5G networks could expand at a lower power level, which would still allow military systems to remain in place and function well in a missile or drone defense crisis.
An option that demands proof
Hypothetically, low-power sharing could allow for the expansion of 5G without degrading military systems. Still, the Pentagon is going to want technical proof.
Here’s why. In the event of an attack, S-band radars open up to their full spectrum allocation, using wideband scan modes for precise detection and tracking of inbound warheads. The adversary may be attempting to launch junk and countermeasures to spoof U.S. radars. The U.S. has hundreds of seconds to shoot back and only a limited number of missile interceptors. Every shot counts. With S-band degraded, commanders may not make the right decision in time. With S-band working properly, radars can pick up the missile in all the clutter and take careful aim.
When defense officials raise concerns about spectrum auctions, they know what they are talking about. First, the fact is that the U.S. government has a history of slapdash spectrum auctions. Rushed auctions have gotten the government into trouble many times.
Years ago, a spectrum auction sold off a frequency used by the B-2 stealth bomber. The price tag to modify the B-2 was over a billion dollars – for just 21 planes. Spectrum auctions in recent years have jeopardized the ability to track hurricanes and interfered with satellite operations, leading to a $39 billion lawsuit. In 2020, a rushed spectrum sale almost compromised aircraft radar altimeters – you know, the instruments all airliners and helicopters use to keep from hitting the ground, or each other. 5G companies had to agree to voluntary limits on signals so that airliners could access airports.
Raising money via spectrum auctions would be nice. But national security should take priority.
Rebecca Grant is a national security analyst and vice president, defense programs for the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization in Arlington, Virginia.
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