By Scott Savitz, Defense Opinion Writer.
The threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan represents one of the largest challenges for the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DoD). A successful Chinese conquest of Taiwan would not only entail the ruthless repression of Taiwan’s population, but it would menace other East Asian nations while facilitating further Chinese power projection.
China would also acquire control of a sophisticated economy with the world’s most important facilities for making computer chips. The seizure of Taiwan would mark a major milestone in China’s efforts to become the dominant power across the globe.
U.S capabilities to deter or prevent this outcome are hampered by a number of factors, a couple of which stand out.
First, at the policy level, the indefinite continuation of half-century-old policies intended to garner Chinese cooperation against the Soviet Union impedes the U.S. Specifically, the U.S. is explicitly ambiguous about whether it will help defend Taiwan, whose government it does not recognize, and it precludes itself from stationing forces on the island.
The result is that unless policies change, U.S. forces are inherently disadvantaged. They are largely unable to operate in the prospective battlespace until an attack has begun and the U.S. has committed to countering it.
Second, the U.S. faces a tyranny of distance. At any given time, essentially all Chinese forces are in East Asia, while only a fraction of U.S. forces are. China could aspire to rapidly seize Taiwan before much larger U.S. forces from North America and around the world could arrive, presenting U.S. strategists with a fait accompli that would be hard to reverse.
Deterrence through asymmetrical capabilities
A strong case can be made for expanding America’s military capacity in the coming years to strengthen the ability of the U.S. to deter People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces and other threats around the globe. But it takes years to train personnel and to build the ships, aircraft and vehicles needed to bolster existing capacity; it takes even longer to develop and integrate new capabilities. Congress and the Department of Defense could pursue that expansion, but complementary approaches are needed to achieve near-term effects that could help to deter or, if necessary, defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
For years,
insightful observers have called for Taiwan to adopt a “porcupine” approach to its own defense, enabling Taiwan to inflict substantial damage to any invasion force through development of asymmetrical capabilities. Taiwan’s government has taken some important steps in this direction. However, it could accelerate them within the next few years. The DoD could work more extensively with Taiwan to expand multiple aspects of porcupine strategies, some of which are very low cost.
One way of obstructing a Chinese conquest of Taiwan involves literal obstruction–emplacing obstacles that would delay a Chinese invasion force, while rendering that force more vulnerable to other types of attack.
Taiwan could make prospective invasion beaches less accessible by creating artificial reefs offshore, either by sinking defunct ships or emplacing large, hollow shapes made of concrete or other durable materials. The contributions of such features to ecotourism by divers, and their ability to dampen surges from storms or tsunamis, could more than compensate for the minimal costs associated with them. Chinese ships or landing craft would run aground, sustaining damage or becoming immobilized and highly vulnerable at a critical moment.
Similarly, Taiwan could place rows of anti-vehicle obstacles on the beaches themselves. These need not annoy aesthetically inclined beachgoers; like many security barriers for buildings, they could be decoratively designed concrete-and-metal posts. The gaps between posts in any given row could be narrow enough to prevent vehicle passage, but wide enough to enable beachgoers to reach the water.
While the People’s Liberation Army could bombard those maritime and land obstacles, doing so takes critical time and resources, while also prematurely revealing where it plans to land. Chunks of obstacles would inevitably remain strewn around the battlespace in ways that could continue to impede or channelize movement, making forces more vulnerable to other types of attack. In the maritime environment, battle-damage assessments would take time and have limited accuracy, so the reefs would still impale some vessels.
Taiwan could take these measures now for millions of U.S. dollars, a fraction of the $20 billion that Taiwan spends annually on defense, let alone the $800 billion that the U.S. spends.
Many more naval mines
A second approach entails the use of naval mines. Like obstacles, these are consummate operational disruptors. Whatever combination of countermeasures the PLA uses, from traditional hunting or sweeping operations to simply sending the least valuable ships first, the mines would slow and channelize movements.
Mine countermeasures ships are fragile and move slowly in predictable patterns, making them perfect targets for shore-based weapons, while other ships that sail through the minefield could experience damage and become obstructions for those that follow.
In addition to inflicting a “body count” of PLA vessels, mines could have a powerful effect in terms of delaying and disrupting the invasion force. Taiwan could achieve all of these ends with mines that use technology from the mid-20th century or earlier, with each mine costing about one hundred times less than an anti-ship missile.
Taiwan has some mines and minelayers, but continuing to expand its inventory of both—and perhaps modifying other ships and aircraft to make them minelayers when needed—would be valuable.
Forces would need to relentlessly practice loading and laying the mines, so that the process can be done quickly without single points of failure. Repeatedly leaving behind inert mine shapes would make PLA minehunters’ mission still harder. Taiwanese forces could also pre-load mines onto vessels when a crisis is brewing, both to shorten minelaying timelines and to signal Beijing that Taiwan will be prepared to lay them, if necessary.
Scorched-earth approach
A third, complementary approach entails preparations to rapidly and thoroughly destroy infrastructure in danger of immediate capture. If the PLA captures a port or major airfield, plus the immediate surrounding area, it will be in a position to move forces onto the island much more quickly than via beaches or paratroop drops. Taiwanese forces need to be prepared to destroy those facilities before they fall into the hands of the PLA.
By sabotaging equipment, tearing up roads and runways, laying naval and land mines, emplacing booby traps, installing malware and other methods, Taiwan could greatly protract timelines for restoration of those key nodes. It could extend them even further by targeted attacks on reconstruction crews from concealed positions nearby.
Preparations to scorch the earth in this manner would require planning and exercises by small units, which would cost a fraction of the price tag for more aircraft, ships or fleets of ground vehicles. Like the use of obstructions and naval mines, they are also technologically simple, and Taiwan can put the preparations in place within a few years or sooner.
Naturally, the approaches described above represent just some of the ways Taiwan could increase its porcupine capabilities; there are many others. For example, Taiwan could also seek to emulate Ukraine’s successes in employing uncrewed air and maritime vehicles and could employ ever-greater numbers of anti-ship cruise missiles. The point is not the specific mechanisms, but the advancement of the overall porcupine approach.
The limits and opportunities of a ‘porcupine’ approach
There are two key caveats with respect to porcupine defenses. The first is that they are emphatically meant to complement existing and emerging capabilities, rather than to supplant them. These defenses can disrupt, delay, and degrade the PLA if it attempts to take Taiwan; they will not defeat it. The complete panoply of firepower from ships, aircraft, missiles and ground forces are required to render PLA attackers combat-ineffective.
The second is that only Taiwan can implement the porcupine approach. Such efforts depend on Taiwanese commands and agencies wanting to undertake them. The U.S. should collaborate with Taiwanese counterparts on this, but the U.S. needs to acknowledge that only Taiwan has the authority to perform these actions in its own territory.
Despite these limitations, the U.S. could greatly enhance deterrence of China by working with Taiwanese authorities to rapidly foster porcupine capabilities. If implemented, such efforts could help to stymie China’s ability to invade Taiwan, preventing an outcome that would be disastrous for Taiwan, the United States and the entire world.
The low cost and easy implementation of these approaches can make it possible to succeed in deterring a near-term invasion of Taiwan.
Scott Savitz is a senior engineer at the RAND Corp. He has led numerous studies for U.S. services and their allied counterparts on subjects such as naval mine warfare, uncrewed vehicles, non-lethal weapons and Arctic operations.
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