Ranking Republican Says Anti-BMD Hearing ‘A Fraud’
Obering Asks, If An Enemy Launches A Missile From An Unmarked Ship, How Could U.S. Forces Retaliate?
Democratic legislators lacerated and lambasted the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in a hearing last week, and the panel chairman said more hearings are a possibility.
The fireworks came during the latest in a series of hearings before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee national security and foreign affairs subcommittee, chaired by Rep. John F. Tierney (D-Mass.).
And Tierney, responding to a question from Space & Missile Defense Report, said after the hearing that more sessions may follow.
“We are conducting comprehensive, sustained oversight” of the U.S. multilayered shield to protect the nation against enemy missiles, the congressman said. “The first three hearings addressed the initial issues: what are the true threats, where are we after 25 years and $150 billion, and what does the MDA itself have to say about these things?
“There was revealing testimony.”
But Tierney said he isn’t satisfied with the three hearings, adding that more probing is required.
“We need to drill down and work through some more basic questions here, like shouldn’t research come ahead of procurement?” he said. “There is a lot more work to do, so we will continue our oversight plan.”
Just what that will mean hasn’t yet been decided, he said. “Whether that is in the form of future hearings, a report or otherwise has yet to be determined,” he said.
The hearing last week was long and heated.
After several Democrats on the dais threw scores of questions at Lt. Gen. Henry A. “Trey” Obering III, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) director, Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, the ranking Republican, angrily complained about the tenor and format of the hearing.
Noting that Tierney limited Obering’s initial testimony to no more than five minutes, Shays turned to Tierney, sitting beside him, and said, “I’m stunned. … I deeply regret it,” that the head of an agency would be given a mere five minutes to present testimony reporting on all that his agency is doing. Tierney said that Obering was limited to five minutes because a visiting head of state was going to be addressing Congress later that day.
“This is a fraud,” Shays said. “It’s just a fraud.” Those comments were unusual, since lawmakers usually address each other in courtly, or at least polite, terms, because the legislator who opposes you today may be someone you seek out to support you on a different issue tomorrow.
Later, Shays walked out of the hearing, leaving only Democrats to continue pelting Obering with questions.
While Obering’s 28-page prepared testimony and a series of slides and videos was cut down to five minutes, however, Obering did hand the subcommittee a written six-page rebuttal paper, with each of the charges leveled by BMD foes, and facts to rebut those allegations. (Please see rebuttal paper in reprinted in this issue.)
The hearing was structured in two parts, with Obering testifying first, followed by a panel of missile defense critics to whom Obering didn’t have the opportunity to respond.
Democratic questioners had a series of themes they put forth: that missile defense systems are expensive, that the Democrats think the systems haven’t been thoroughly tested in realistic scenarios, and that at least some of the money spent on missile defense could be spent elsewhere, so outlays must be prioritized.
For his part, Obering had a few points of his own to make: ballistic missile systems have done well in tests, the tests are increasingly realistic, missile defense is a minuscule 2 percent of the Department of Defense budget, and if anyone thinks that erecting a missile shield is expensive, consider what the damage cost would be if a missile tipped with a weapon of mass destruction descends unchallenged on New York City or Washington.
Further, he noted that some tough critics see the missile defense program as well run. For example, all the nations in NATO have endorsed placing a European Missile Defense (EMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Here is a sampling of the back-and-forth:
Tierney asked whether it was true that most potential rogue-nation adversaries have only short-range missiles.
Obering said while many potential enemies have short- and medium-range missiles, Iran and North Korea are working on obtaining steadily longer-range missiles, that U.S. intelligence agencies have found. But intel can be wrong. For example, North Korea was thought to be eight to 10 years from having any longer-range missiles when, in 1998, it fired a missile in an arc over Japan that landed in the Pacific Ocean.
Tierney asked whether, yes or no, it is unlikely that nations with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as China, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the like are not expected to attack the United States, and therefore the only nations posing missile threats are Iran and North Korea.
Obering responded that Iran and North Korea may share missile technology with others.
Tierney said that if any nation launches a missile at the United States, American forces would see from which nation the missile launched, and launch a devastating counterattack on that nation.
Obering at that point asked whether the United States wants rogue nations able to hold cites or entire allied nations at risk of nuclear attack, which could intimidate those nations and the United States.
Later, Obering noted that a rogue nation could send an unmarked ship to a point in the ocean off the U.S. or allied coasts, and fire missiles from there, leaving the United States not knowing which nation originated the attack, and thus not knowing where to direct the counterattack.
Tierney asked, in effect, whether Obering thinks the government is made of money, so that it can spend unlimited amounts on missile defense. Also, Tierney asked whether it would be far more likely that an enemy would smuggle, say, a nuclear bomb into the United States in a ship, rather than placing the bomb atop a missile fired at a U.S. target.
Obering responded that MDA spends a tiny fraction of the defense budget. Further, the United States must be prepared to counter both types of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
Tierney said Obering didn’t wish to prioritize in countering various threats, but rather, the chairman alleged, MDA wants to spend without limit.
The MDA budget request for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2009, is for $9.4 billion, out of a total Department of Defense and military outlay exceeding $600 billion.
Rep. Betty McCollum (D-Minn.) told Obering that it is “hard to justify $10 billion” for missile defense, arguing that there are cheaper ways to attack the United States than using missiles.
Obering responded that he was there as the MDA chief to talk about his responsibility, blocking missile attacks.
Rep. Peter Welch (D-Vt.) asserted that the government doesn’t have “infinite resources” to pay for missile defense, and said there is a serious threat that an enemy might bring a weapon of mass destruction to the United States in a ship instead of atop a missile.
Obering agreed it would be possible an enemy might attempt to do that, while again pointing out that an enemy also could launch a missile from a ship, where the identity of the nation originating the attack is concealed.
And, Obering noted, there are 120 nations around the world that possess various types of missiles. In that event, the United States must be able to protect itself by defeating the incoming missile, he said.
Rep. Chris Van Hollen Jr. (D-Md.) challenged the capability and worth of the U.S. ballistic missile defense shield, asking whether it could overcome countermeasures built into Russian ICBMs. Obering asked whether that would be in 2015 or today, saying that today, no, U.S. missile defense systems cannot overcome Russian countermeasures.
But the multi-layered U.S. missile defense shield can overcome countermeasures on Iranian or North Korean missiles, he said.
Asked whether by 2015 those missile shield systems would be able to overcome countermeasures on Russian missiles, Obering said that by then, “We should have a pretty good leg up” on that challenge, if Iran or North Korea acquired those countermeasures and deployed them on missiles.
Obering added, however, that the United States, even with fully fielded missile defense systems, never would be able to counter the might of Russia, which has a vast arsenal of missiles and nuclear warheads.
Asked whether it is true that MDA hasn’t tested its missile defense systems against sophisticated countermeasures, Obering replied, “We’ve flown very sophisticated countermeasures” in target missiles against American missile defense systems.
Rep. Paul Hodes (D-N.H.) asked whether it is true that $125 billion has been spent on missile defense development over 25 years, and yet there have been only two successful Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) tests.
Obering responded that yes, that’s true, in the new GMD configuration there have been two successful tests — and, beyond that, in the old and less capable version there were six successful tests out of nine attempts.
Asked whether MDA is doing salvo tests against multiple missiles, Obering indicated that that was being done against shorter or medium range targets, but long-range target missiles cover such vast areas in their trajectories that each one “is like a single engagement,” even if more than one is fired.
Asked whether bad weather can cause problems for interceptor missiles, Obering said that wouldn’t be a factor, because the same bad weather wouldn’t likely hit all the various radars/sensors of the full multi-layered ballistic missile defense system simultaneously. “It’s not something we’re very much concerned about,” he said.
When Tierney asked about the capability of the U.S. missile defense shield to overcome decoys deployed by enemy ICBMs, Obering refused to answer the question in open session of the subcommittee, saying that would get into classified material.
Tierney repeatedly pushed Obering to answer, unsuccessfully. “They don’t classify things when it’s good news,” Tierney said. “I hope that’s not going to be your answer to everything.”
Obering replied that he was sure Tierney wouldn’t wish to have sensitive information get out to Iran or North Korea.
That, Tierney retorted, was “a red herring.”
Obering replied, “That’s exactly what we’re talking about.”
McCollum asked him whether it would cost $213 billion to $277 billion more to complete the U.S. missile defense shield, beyond $110 billion spent through 2003, noting that she also sits on the House Appropriations Committee. (She does not sit on its defense subcommittee.)
Obering said it is important to cover all the threats of possible annihilation of any American city.
Further, he said, rather than having costs soaring out of control, missile defense programs are within 9 percent of cost estimates.
At another point, he said, “we have a good record in terms of” controlling costs and schedules of missile defense development programs, thereby justifying the special budget flexibility that Congress granted to MDA. “There are some hard budget decisions being made” in missile defense programs, he said.
Earlier last week, MDA came out well compared to some other defense programs, in a separate hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. (Please see separate story in this issue.)
As to those gargantuan estimates of future missile defense costs, “They’re making assumptions about what we’ll continue and what programs we won’t continue,” he said.
And those assumptions may be wrong. For example, if the Airborne Laser (ABL) system proves it will work to kill enemy missiles in their boost phase, just after launch from a silo or pad, then MDA won’t also need the Kinetic Energy Interceptor system to hit enemy missiles in their boost phase.
Hodes asked why MDA runs simulation tests of missile defense systems, instead of actual field tests against target missiles. Obering said while some flight tests are conducted, running them against dozens of targets would be “cost prohibitive,” while simulation tests are far cheaper. Simulation tests can be informed by flight tests, including the MDA-Navy move in February to shoot down an errant, dysfunctional U.S. satellite carrying a tank filled with toxic hydrazine fuel.
When Hodes questioned whether simulation tests are highly scripted and unrealistic, Obering referred him to the Pentagon office of testing and evaluation, which found that MDA is on the right path in assessing performance of missile defense systems.
Tierney said MDA is moving to simpler rather than more complex target missiles in shootdown tests, but Obering said the shift was because of software and hardware changes, not because MDA was reluctant to have BMD systems go up against challenging targets.
White Paint On Missiles
Tierney also asked about an assertion that an enemy can defeat the Airborne Laser missile defense system merely by painting its missiles white, because supposedly the white paint would reflect 90 percent of the laser light.
That charge was made previously by Philip E. Coyle III, senior adviser to the World Security Institute and a former Pentagon chief weapons tester.
And yet MDA has tested lasers on missile bodies painted white, and the laser has annihilated those missile segments. (Please see Space & Missile Defense Report, Monday, April 21, 2008.)
Coyle appeared at the hearing, on the second panel of witnesses, and repeated his assertion, that “to defeat the Airborne Laser an enemy might use white paint as a countermeasure. … I could have chosen other surface preparations that are even more reflective than white paint.”
That, Obering told Tierney, is wrong.
“We have evaluated literally hundreds of coatings,” such as various paints and ablative materials, and none have defeated the laser, Obering said.
The ABL involves a highly modified 747-400 jumbo jet by prime contractor The Boeing Co. [BA], with laser gear by Northrop Grumman Corp. [NOC] and a beam control/fire control system to aim the laser beam contributed by Lockheed Martin Corp. [LMT].
Then Tierney moved to questioning the ABL cost, asking whether it would run to $1.5 billion per production aircraft, with seven aircraft in the program, or about $10.5 billion over 14 years.
That is not necessarily what would ensue from the development portion of the program, Obering said.
On the cost of missile defense, Obering noted that the devastation of just one missile hitting an American city could run into “hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, if you can’t stop that missile.” And, he added, the threat is there, with a tremendous proliferation of missiles around the world.
Obering concluded that a missile defense shield permits the United States to negotiate against rogue states from a position of strength.
Tierney said only that there is not an inexhaustible supply of money to fund missile defense.
However, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee has neither authorizing power nor appropriating power over MDA. Those panels last year moved to fund MDA at close to its requested budget levels, and this year, the Senate Armed Services Committee just marked up legislation that would provide solid support for missile defense programs. (Please see full story in this issue.)