Terror Tactics Take A New Turn
When terrorists flew airliners into the World Trade Center, it would be fair to say the element of surprise had been fully exploited.
Only one prognosis for that scenario had ever appeared in public and that was a teenage boy’s Nov. 30, 2000 innocent question on an Airliners.net forum about the possible effect of a fully fuelled 707 being flown into a WTC skyscraper (see tinyurl.com/y91).
MD90’s hypothetical forum posting elicited 19 replies, the last on Dec. 2, 2000, and then the thread faded into obscurity.
However, it had debated the destructive effects of such an act, mentioned terrorists and the use of a 757. Coincidence? When you look at the timing of Al Qaeda confessor Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s plot for Sept. 11, 2001, some 10 months later, you have to wonder about his inspiration.
It appears that inspiration can come from both theoretical concept and events. The distinct advantage that terrorists have is that they can call the shots, the timing and the tactics. They just need some inspiration. Recent events in Sri Lanka might provide that. But first some background on the risk riddles that remain unresolved.
The preoccupation with both internal and external terror threats to aviation centers around MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense System). Congress is agitating for a solution, but the Air Transport Association is rejecting, on behalf of its member airlines, the prospective carriage of any detect, deter, deflect or destroy technologies such as Northrop Grumman’s Guardian.
Despite the airline’s reluctance, we are now in the $109 million, third phase of a Homeland Security Dept. study of the feasibility of equipping the U.S. commercial aircraft fleet. FedEx will be flying 11 MD-10s with NG’s directed infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) technology over the next 18 months, testing whether the equipment, developed for the military, is cost-effective and reliable enough for commercial aircraft operations.
BAe Systems, paired with American Airlines, is employing BAe’s “JetEye,” based on its advanced threat infrared countermeasures (ATIRCM) system used on U.S. Army aircraft. BAe has experimentally mounted JetEye on an American Airlines Boeing 767. These systems are based upon tried and true military kit but the cost of even subsidized deployment fleet- wide would be prohibitive.
The life-long drag, weight, training and fuel penalties would erode airline profits. Maintenance of such systems is also a hassle. It would cost between $1 million and $3 million to put the missile warning and DIRCM systems on each aircraft and on top of that are supply and spares issues, plus maintenance costs, the Department of Homeland Security’s technology chief, Jay Cohen said at a recent Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association conference.
The airlines, some of which are just emerging from bankruptcy, are “not fond of that idea,” he said. Would it become a no-go item? How effective would it be? What would be the false alarm rate? How safe is it for third parties? What are the alternatives?
Raytheon has developed a microwave-based airfield defense concept for protection against surface-to-air missiles. This defensive capability has been refined for commercial airports to make it part of a layered defense to counter the terrorist MANPADS threat at civilian airfields. Vigilant Eagle uses a simple Active Protection technique of illuminating the missile body with electromagnetic energy tailored to distract the missile’s tracking sensors and homing control.
When located at a commercial airport, Vigilant Eagle would create a dome of protection around the airport, protecting all aircraft during their vulnerable takeoff and landing phases of flight. The cost of mounting and manning such a system nationwide? Immense. And not being organic, what about protection at international destinations worldwide? That’s probably where the real threat lies: overseas.
Homeland Security’s latest initiative involves placing a drone in a perpetual orbit at 65,000 feet over major airports. It’s part of a broader effort called “Project Chloe.” The Drone’s warning indicators would theoretically detect the ultraviolet plume (UV) from a missile’s rocket booster and trigger an anti-missile laser, which could be fired from the drone. That laser would lock on to the missile, essentially blinding its ability to pursuit-track its target.
Kerry Wilson, deputy administrator of Homeland Security’s anti-missile program, says the robot orbiter will be under testing soon on station over the Patuxent River Naval Air Station near Washington. Yet to be proven: Whether or not the UV detection technology can be seduced or cloaked by countermeasures and whether it will work through deep cloud layers, heavy precipitation and in all types of convective weather.
If it does function per design, it might be a viable area protection system. From 65,000 feet, you can “see” quite a few major airports, but the range capability of an onboard laser tailored to the power generation of the RQ4 Global Hawk UAV would probably be quite limited. So, alternatively and additionally, the missile could be drone-detected but the engagement would then be delegated to an in situ Valiant Eagle site on the ground at the affected airport.
These orbiter tests follow on from four years of research on a variety of anti-missile laser systems that could be mounted on the bellies of airliners for $1 million or more per plane. The initial and ongoing costs have proven to be indigestible to the airlines. They see the anti-MANPADS defenses as being a national defence responsibility.
We don’t pretend to have any real solutions, nor have we seen evidence of a tangible threat — and yet, although we endorse counter-intelligence as a fundamental defense against such threats, there is a feeling that action needs to be taken. But what about the other lower tech threats for airliners departing airports? Here, we’re not talking about through-terminal human threats that can board airliners, but the other “perimeter” threats that exist.
The Nov. 3, 2003 ASW addressed the threat posed by the .50cal sniper’s rifle. We pointed out that “at 10 to 12 shots per minute, the 2,000 yard effective range of that weapon becomes painfully relevant”. Those guns are also easily obtained and usable from far beyond an airport’s security perimeter. They can use armor piercing incendiary ammunition at $2 per round.
The Violence Policy Center in Washington (http://www.vpc.org) and a 1995 RAND Corp study identified the .50cal rifle as a lethal threat to airliners. They come complete with night-scopes. A GAO assessment of their lethality is at tinyurl.com/28ywpw. Is there an even greater domestic threat to airports languishing unidentified?
On March 26, at about 0045L, two light strike aircraft manned by dissidents of the previously unknown Air Force of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked Sri Lanka’s international airport North of Colombo (CMB). They focused their attention on the Katunayake Air Force Base on the opposite side of the runway to the international terminal.
At least three airmen were killed and 17 others injured in the attack. Terrified passengers waiting for flights at the nearby international airport described panic and chaos as people ran for cover amid the sound of explosions. All flights into and out of CMB were suspended and passengers on aircraft were evacuated into the airport terminal building.
Cathay Pacific, which had one of its aircraft trapped on the ground full of passengers, has suspended all flights into Colombo until further notice. Two light aircraft dropped three bombs on the air base, but the bombs were directed at the barracks and did not hit the more valuable targets: the Israeli Kfir and Russian Mig 27 fighters and helicopter gun ships parked there.
The Tamil Tigers’ last suicide attack on Bandaranaike International Airport was a ground assault on July 24, 2001, when sappers destroyed more than a dozen military aircraft plus two A330’s, one A340 and one A320 at the civilian terminal.
The greater damage was to the economy and tourism. The government signed a ceasefire brokered by Norway with the Tigers in 2002, but hostilities resurfaced in late 2005. More than 4,000 fighters and civilians have been killed in the last 15 months alone.
The LTTE air capability first emerged in 1998 when two small planes were used to shower rose petals on a crowd commemorating slain comrades. How lethal and sophisticated are their aircraft and weapons?
Photographs released by the LTTE on March 26 show the LTTE leader Prabhakaran with six air wing personnel and a light aircraft that appears to be a Czech-built Zlin Z-143 or Z- 242. Its armament is four bombs mounted on a light series carrier that is attached in line with the wing’s trailing-edge between the undercarriage struts. For imagery and links to the ready availability of Zlin aircraft and bombs, see tinyurl.com/3xhyjs.
The LTTE air wing, called Vaanpuligal, was operating from a 1,250 m air strip in Mullaitivu district. However, the ZLIN Z-143 type only requires 650m of unpaved straight road, when fully loaded, to get airborne. The Zlin can easily have its wings removed and be hidden. The Z-143 has a range of 1100kms fully fueled. However, it’s thought to have been brought into the Sri Lankan Northern Jaffna Peninsula area in kit form and assembled.
The key to modifying a light aircraft in such a manner is the existence of centerbody underwing hard-points. Being a Czech-built military trainer that was widely used in the Soviet bloc, the four-seat Zlin Z-143’s and the two-seat Zlin Z-242’s are available in large numbers. The Sinhalese majority government has set up an inquiry into how the Tigers could have flown their planes for more than 200 kms (125 miles) undetected.
India had given Sri Lanka two radar stations last year, but they failed to pick up the low-flying, low-speed Tiger aircraft. They can cruise quietly right back at 65 knots or “dash” out after weapons release at 143kts.
The LTTE air-strike is rudimentary but strategically effective. It puts Colombo’s rear-echelon areas on a war-footing. The token air-power arm also adds to the LTTE’s coastal maritime warfare capability, known as the Sea Tigers.
The LTTE aircraft appear to have a facsimile light series carrier capable of carrying 4 x 100lb (half-size Mk81) bombs that are sway-braced, lanyard nose-fuze armed and electrically “pickle-able”. See imagery at tinyurl.com/2lgdfy. Their bomb-carrier appears fabricated, utilitarian and in no way sophisticated.
The question now is whether terrorists elsewhere will adopt this new terror tactic. After all, it was the Tamil Tigers who first invented the suicide bomber.