Three panels of experts put down critics’ allegations that missile defense programs don’t work or have other shortcomings, allegations that are being used by some leaders in Washington to underpin spending cuts in those missile protection programs.
That marathon round of presentations came in a forum organized by the Marshall Institute think tank, and by the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA), an industry-related group.
The Marshall Institute breakfast event at the Capitol Hill Club focused on missile defense systems that kill enemy missiles just after they are launched, in the so-called boost phase of ballistic flight.
In the Marshall Institute event, there first was a panel with:
- Robert Pfaltzfraff, president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
- Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute
- Peter Huessy, president of GeoStrategic Analysis
Then there was a panel with four industry leaders of missile defense programs:
- Greg Hyslop, vice president and general manager of missile defense systems with The Boeing Co. [BA]
- Retired Lt. Gen. Larry Dodgen, vice president and deputy general manager of missions systems missile defense with Northrop Grumman Corp. [NOC]
- Mike Booen, vice president of advanced missile defense systems with Raytheon Co. [RTN] (Please see separate story with Booen telephone interview in this issue.)
- Glen Haskins, a program manager with Lockheed Martin Corp. [LMT]
At a separate afternoon event in the National Press Club, MDAA President Riki Ellison presented:
- Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry A. “Trey” Obering III, former director of the Missile Defense Agency
- Robert Joseph, a former State Department official
These are the arguments that critics have used to attack missile defense programs, attempting to justify cutting or killing them, along with the responses from the experts.
First, opponents of the Airborne Laser (ABL) claim that it is useless, because the laser can’t fire through clouds to hit enemy missiles.
But that ignores the fact that clouds usually don’t go higher than 30,000 to 35,000 feet, so an enemy missile, seconds after it launches, soars above any clouds and becomes clearly visible to the ABL aircraft cruising at 40,000 to 45,000 feet, Hyslop stated, responding to a question from Space & Missile Defense Report. “We operate the aircraft above 40,000 feet,” and can shoot the laser at the enemy missile as it clears the cloud tops, he said. That steady and unrelenting blast is the benefit of a laser directed energy weapon, he added.
Second, opponents of ABL claim that it can’t damage a missile if it is painted white, because white paint reflects light including a laser beam. The opponents also allege that if an enemy missile rotates in flight, the laser can’t heat any one point on the missile body to destroy it.
But a laser has blasted a hole in a white-painted missile body. (Please see Space & Missile Defense Report, Monday, April 21, 2008.) The ABL can maintain the beam steadily on target and destroy it, Hyslop said. Further, ABL not only can blast a hole in the side of a missile, the laser beam also fries the missile electronics, so the weapon is disabled, Hyslop replied. The ABL would “adversely affect the performance of the missile,” he said. “There are a number of kill effects.”
Third, critics say rogue nations have limited capabilities in long range missilery, and in nuclear weapons design. And further development would be required to miniaturize atomic weapons to fit atop missiles. Therefore, the critics say, there is no need to rush ahead with missile defense programs.
That is wrong, Obering said. Developing missile defense systems also requires years of effort, meaning that those programs must proceed rapidly with full support if the defensive systems are to be operational when rogue nations begin wielding nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, attempting to blackmail peaceful nations.
Further, he said, if a nation can launch a satellite that within minutes is over the United States, rogue nations may be further along in development than suspected.
Iran recently launched a satellite into orbit that 30 minutes later was over the United States.
The only reason the United States was able to have operational missile defense systems poised at the ready when North Korea launched its long-range missile yesterday is that the United States initiated an accelerated missile defense development program in 2004, Obering observed.
He noted that the U.S. multilayered missile defense system didn’t shoot down the North Korean missile because it didn’t threaten a defended area, such as the United States.
Fourth, critics say that missile defense won’t work.
But Obering noted that missile defense systems have achieved strong results in tests, with the overwhelming majority of tests ending with the target missile annihilated.
Fifth, critics say there have been no missile attacks on the United States.
However, Obering noted that increasingly, rogue nations and terrorist groups are using missiles as a sort of air force in many overseas areas. With an accelerating proliferation of missile technology across the globe, “we are at a critical crossroads for missile defense,” where those programs need to be supported and advanced, he said.
Sixth, critics say that perhaps some systems such as the sea-based Aegis weapon control and its companion Standard Missile interceptor may be performing adequately, other systems still in development haven’t proven themselves.
But Obering said what can one expect: those systems still are in development. Further, he noted, one could have said similar things about the Aegis-SM or Ground-based Midcourse Defense systems before they were developed and went operational. Those systems wouldn’t be in place, protecting the United States and its allies, if such arguments had been used to kill funding for those programs years ago, he said.
While critics complain about the $100 billion cost of missile defense development spread over decades, Joseph said if North Korea continues to perfect its long-range missile, there will come a day when the North could practice nuclear blackmail and hold U.S. cities hostage, unless the United States develops a workable missile defense.
Obering has observed often that if just one enemy nuclear missile struck a U.S. city, the loss would be multiples greater than $100 billion, and that wouldn’t count the value of American lives lost. “We cannot afford to have a nuclear warhead impact on the United States or our allies,” Obering said. “If we are able to stop just one” incoming nuclear- tipped missile, “we will have paid for missile defense many times over.”
Worse, without missile defense, enemy missiles become worth more, and North Korea is infamous for proliferating nuclear and missile technologies to other rogue regimes, for a price.
“Some of us believe that Pyongyang will sell anything it can produce,” Joseph said.
Seventh, critics say that the United States can avoid the need for missile defense systems just by sitting down and talking with rogue states and persuading them to give up their missile and nuclear programs.
But North Korea, by its forbidden and illegal missile launch and its refusal to turn over its nuclear weapons to inspectors, shows that it doesn’t abide by agreements to denuclearize and cease missile programs.
Chances that North Korea ever would do that, Joseph said, “are zero.”
Iran and North Korea are “tied together at the hip,” and advances in dangerous technologies in one rogue state are likely to migrate to the other, Joseph observed.
Eighth, some military analysts say North Korean missiles could be demolished on the launch pad, before they lift off, if the United States were to employ air strikes.
But Joseph noted that isn’t being done, so missile defense systems become critically important when the North does go ahead with missile launches.
He also observed that the United States isn’t just responsible for defending itself against missile attacks, but also is responsible for defending allies that are much closer to rogue states.
Ninth, some critics say that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) protection against long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a variant, the proposed European Missile Defense (EMD) system, aren’t needed, because the Aegis-SM-3 or THAAD systems can be used instead.
But that is incorrect, Joseph noted, saying that Patriot and Aegis systems effective against short- and medium-range enemy missiles aren’t designed to take down long range or ICBM threats, meaning that the GMD and EMD are needed.
He and Obering noted that the United States also needs defensive systems able to take down enemy missiles in their boost phase, midcourse and terminal phase of the ballistic trajectory, so as to provide the greatest number of chances to hit and kill an incoming missile.
Tenth, critics dismiss North Korean missile prowess, noting that the long-range Taepo Dong-2 didn’t go as far as it was supposed to, and therefore this is not a major threat.
However, Obering noted that North Korea has had many successful rocket launches. In a 2006 mass salvo launch in which a Taepo Dong-2 destructed seconds after liftoff, there were six other missiles that functioned well.