The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is conducting a month-long review of the Eclipse 500 Very Light Jet (VLJ) in response to allegations of safety issues when the VLJ was certified by the federal agency in 2006. The charges will also be aired at a congressional hearing in September.
The union representing the federal aircraft certification workers, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), has complained that the FAA ordered that the Eclipse 500 be certified over the objections of FAA inspectors and pilots still testing the aircraft. NATCA filed a grievance in October 2006, alleging that the federal agency certified the aircraft despite “several outstanding safety/regulatory issues.”
The FAA disclosed on Aug. 20 that a review team had on Aug. 11 begun a 30-day review of the Eclipse 500. Jerry Mack, a former Boeing safety executive, is leading an oversight team of seven FAA experts with specialties such as flight testing, avionics, and certification. The team members are independent of the original certification group.
The FAA convened this Special Certification Review (SCR) team to look at: aircraft safety, certification of aircraft trim, flaps, screen blanking, and stall speeds. These issues were the subject of Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) that have been filed by operators since the aircraft was certificated on September 30, 2006. The team will look at whether or not any of these issues were raised during the certification process and if any of the issues are currently a threat to safety.
In the past decade, the FAA has conducted only six similar special reviews of particular aircraft. They included the Liberty XL-2 (2008), Mitsubishi MU-2B (2005), Cessna 208 (2005), Twin Cessna 400 Series Models (2004), Raytheon 390 (2004), and the Beechcraft T34 (2003).
Eclipse Aviation, the aircraft’s manufacturer, said it welcomed the FAA’s review and would cooperate. “Eclipse is confident the review will find that the Eclipse 500 was in full compliance with all federal regulations at the time of its certification, and that all FAA testing was completed with the highest degree of thoroughness, accuracy and integrity,” the company said in a statement.
“Without a doubt, this special review will uncover what we already know – that the Eclipse 500 marks the safest new airplane introduction into service in 20 years,” said Roel Pieper, Eclipse Aviation’s CEO. “Customer safety has always been a priority at Eclipse, and we look forward to this investigation dispelling any inaccuracies about the certification of this airplane for once and for all.”
In June, the FAA briefly grounded the Eclipse 500 after a flaw was discovered that caused one to lose power over Chicago. Both engines on the Eclipse 500 became stuck at full power as the pilots were trying to land.
The FAA, at the urging of the National Transportation Board (NTSB), issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive, mandating throttle control inspections for over 200 of the very light jets.
The NTSB had issued two urgent recommendations to the FAA regarding the Eclipse 500. The Safety Board said the FAA should: require immediate inspection of all Eclipse 500 airplane throttle quadrants to ensure that pushing the throttle levers against the maximum power stops will not result in an engine control failure; and, the FAA should further require that all units that fail inspection be replaced and replacement parts be similarly inspected.
The Safety Board also urged the FAA to require Eclipse to immediately develop for the Eclipse 500 airplane an emergency procedure for a dual engine control failure and incorporate the procedure into the airplane flight manual and quick reference handbook via an airworthiness directive.
On June 5, the Eclipse 500 (N612KB) on approach to Chicago Midway Airport, experienced a failure that resulted in uncontrollable maximum power thrust from two Pratt and Whitney Canada PW610F turbofan engines.
After referencing the emergency procedures of the aircraft’s quick reference handbook, the pilots shut down one of the engines. However, following the shutdown of the engine, the other engine rolled back to idle power and continued to be unresponsive to the throttle.
The pilots declared an emergency, were cleared to land on any runway and were able to land the plane without injury to the two pilots or two passengers.
The Safety Board noted that the dual-channel failure of both throttle levers occurred after the airplane had accumulated only 238 hours and 192 cycles since new. As a result, the Board is concerned about the reliability of an assembly that fails in such a short time.
Furthermore, when the failed throttle quadrant assembly was replaced on the accident airplane, pushing the throttle levers on the replacement unit against maximum power stops caused an R ENG CONTROL FAIL message to appear on the crew alerting system display.
The Board further noted that the Eclipse 500’s flight manual and quick reference handbook provide an emergency procedure for a single engine control failure, but not for a dual engine control failure, such as occurred in the incident. The Safety Board is concerned that should there be another dual engine control failure aboard an Eclipse 500, pilots will be without guidance and may be unable to restore control.
Meanwhile, the NTSB continues to investigate another Eclipse 500 incident that occurred July 30 in West Chester, PA.
The EA500 (N333MY) sustained substantial damage during a runway overrun while landing at Brandywine Airport (OQN), but the pilot and sole passenger were not injured.
According to the NTSB’s preliminary report on the accident, during a visual approach to Runway 27, the pilot “set up for a normal approach” and “dropped gear” and “one notch of flaps.” A short time later, when the airplane had slowed, he then selected landing flaps.
The pilot believed that he was “a little high” on the approach so he “dipped down.” As he passed the runway threshold his speed was “a little high,” but he thought it was manageable.
After touchdown, said the NTSB, the pilot “got on the brakes” and felt the airplane skid, but decided not to “go around” due to the “distance left.” At this point he was “pumping” the wheel brakes “continuously,” and then applied “full brakes.” The aircraft began to skid to the right and went off the end of the runway.
After leaving the runway, the EA500 traveled down a 40-foot embankment and crossed a service road. The airplane came to rest against trees and a chain link fence approximately 184 feet beyond the departure end of Runway 27.
Both main landing gears had collapsed and penetrated the upper surface of the wing structure. The wing flaps and the flap lever were found in the landing position. No pre- impact mechanical failures of the flight control system, brake system, engine control systems, or engines were discovered.
Runway 27 (3,347 feet long by 50 feet wide) was in good condition. Skid marks which matched the landing gear geometry of the accident aircraft began approximately 868 feet west of the displaced threshold, and continued for about 2,229 feet until they left the paved portion of the runway where ground scars were present and two broken runway threshold lights were discovered.
According to the Airport Facility Directory, multiple obstructions existed on the approach end of Runway 27. These included trees that were 12 feet in height, which displaced the threshold by 250 feet. The trees were located 659 feet from the approach end of the runway pavement, and 131 feet right of the centerline. A 38:1 slope was required to clear the trees.
A 50:1 approach slope to the displaced threshold was published for the runway, and the available landing length was 3,097 feet. The runway sloped downward 1.0%.
A Precision Approach Path Indicator was installed, but was inoperative at the time of the accident.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiple ratings, including airplane multi-engine land, and type ratings for the Eclipse 500, Hawker Sidley 125, and Learjet. He had 6,300 total hours of flight time on his most recent application for an FAA first-class medical certificate, dated July 2, 2008.
According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2007. At the time of the accident, it had accumulated only 76.2 total hours of operation.
The hearing before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, chaired by Congressman James Oberstar, will be held September 17. The Minnesota democrat has been sharply critical of the FAA of late with disclosure from whistleblowers that Southwest Airlines had failed to comply with FAA-issued airworthiness directives. The panel is expected to hear from the Transportation Department’s Inspector General who was asked to investigate the safety concerns of the FAA workers represented by NATCA.