By Calvin Biesecker

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has made some progress in strengthening the nuclear detection capabilities of the nation but hasn’t identified long-term plans and costs to close gaps in how nuclear or radiological material could be smuggled into the United States, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Taking three primary areas that DNDO previously identified as gaps in the various pathways that could be used to smuggled nuclear material into the country, GAO says that detection efforts remain in the early stages of planning and development.

The three areas identified by DNDO as potential smuggling pathways are the land border areas between ports of entry, aviation and small maritime craft, GAO says in its report, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities (GAO-09-257).

Between the land ports of entry, GAO says that DNDO has been working with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on how to better secure the border from nuclear smuggling but that identifying and testing the radiation detection equipment is unfinished and the test program is behind schedule. In some cases, testing has been postponed because of problems with the technology, the report says.

GAO also says that DNDO hasn’t supplied CBP with detection technology in a timely manner for use at both ports of entry and between the ports.

Regarding aviation, GAO says that DNDO has initiatives underway for screening international planes, passengers and cargo but hasn’t defined how long this will take or how much it will cost to complete this effort. Currently, CBP screens all arriving international general aviation planes, passengers and baggage for radiological and nuclear materials.

Delays had occurred in screening inbound international cargo at the first airport and planned expansion of this effort to all 30 airports handling such cargo won’t be finished until 2014, the report says.

The development and testing of equipment for screening small maritime vessels, which technically are those under 300 gross tons, has occurred but so far use of the technology has been limited to pilot programs to demonstrate the feasibility of the equipment. DNDO is in the first year of a three-year pilot project in two West Coast ports to decide whether the technology can work.

However, GAO says that DNDO hasn’t established any criteria to determine whether the pilot effort should be expanded to other ports, hasn’t determined what other ports should be included, and hasn’t estimated the total costs of the effort.

DNDO is providing the equipment, support and training for the pilot projects but expects local agencies to sustain the efforts through federal grant programs, the report says. However, GAO says that local officials say the uncertainty of federal support “jeopardizes their ability to continue radiological and nuclear detection activities.”

GAO also says that a recommendation it made to DNDO last summer to develop a strategic plan to guide the development of a comprehensive global strategy for nuclear detection hasn’t been acted on.

In responses contained in an annex to the GAO report, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) says that none of the identified nuclear smuggling gaps into the U.S. has a “quick fix.” DHS says that, “In some cases a sustained effort over many years will be necessary.”

DHS also says the GAO report is unbalanced and incomplete about what has been accomplished. For example, DHS says that in the area of small maritime craft, DNDO and the Coast Guard have developed a joint plan for the technology needs of small Coast Guard boarding teams, which achieved full operational capability at the end of FY ’07.

DHS also points out that DNDO and CBP have agreed on a phased deployment plan for the deployment of radiation detection technology with each phase contingent on the results of previous steps, which is therefore open to schedule adjustments. DHS says that the technology solutions here are not easy to come by and that the phased approach limits spending on solutions that don’t work.