Hundreds of disciplinary actions for such things as sleeping on duty and misuse of government equipment show the need for tightened management and oversight of the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), according to a new report by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS/IG).
The FAMS program expanded enormously in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, as evidenced by a budget that ballooned from a miniscule $4.4 million in 2001 to $545 million in 2003.
Considerable growing pains attended that huge increase in resources poured into the program, along with management instability. In the past three years the program has been transferred to different agencies three different times.
Deficiencies persist, and the DHS/IG is not entirely satisfied at the responses it has received, as will be shown below. Nonetheless, DHS/IG Clark Ervin is hopeful. He told ASW, “FAMS has made great strides in hiring and training a significant workforce. However, flaws in the background investigation and disciplinary programs exist.”
“Implementation of our recommendations will increase public confidence in the safety of air travel,” he added.
The report documents some real structural problems with the air marshal program, and clearly they need to be addressed in order to assure the public that an effective program is in place.
Separately from the DHS/IG report, the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA) gives the air marshal program a grade of “C” in its latest aviation security report card, largely because the program is too limited, with a hiring freeze in place and funding recently cut for fiscal 2005.
Nearly a dozen recommendations are contained in the DHS/IG report. We focus here on three:
1. Background investigations
DHS/IG finding: Background checks of a significant number of air marshal applicants with questionable work or personal histories were approved by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). In a pool of 504 applicants, the DHS/IG cited 161 cases that included:
- 46 applicants had filed for bankruptcy in the last seven years, and half of those were at least 90 days delinquent on one or more accounts at the time they were hired.
- Seven applicants had previously misused a government credit card.
- 20 applicants had been fired or resigned from previous employment, and more than a third of them falsified information regarding their terminations when they applied for the air marshal program.
- 26 applicants violated previous employer policies, resulting in work suspensions, written reprimands or forfeiture of pay.
- 62 applicants had been arrested or faced allegations of misconduct, ranging form domestic violence to sexual harassment and/or driving under the influence of alcohol. Half of these applicants had been arrested more than once for similar offenses.
Two cases illustrate the leniency associated with adjudicating background checks:
- An applicant had been fired from the U.S. Customs Service for “sexual harassment and other sexual misconduct with impact on the job” and “disruptive or violent behavior leading to termination or forced resignations.” The Customs Service special agent in charge (SAIC) did not recommend this individual for service as an air marshal because “he is very aggressive, confrontational, and he has the potential to get in trouble.”
- Another applicant was denied a gun permit by the State of New York. The reason for the denial was not in the applicant’s background investigation. The DHS/IG report said, “After we highlighted the fact that an air marshal carries a weapon 24 hours a day, seven days a week, including in the State of New York, the adjudicator agreed to inquire further regarding the permit denial.
DHS/IG recommendation: Revise the suitability guidelines to include: (1) disqualifying criminal, credit, employment and other background issues, and (2) setting limits on the length of time between derogatory incident and date of selection.
Border and Transportation Security (BTS) response: BTS disagrees with the conclusion that adjudication standards were too lenient based upon a review of 161 cases. (ASW note: BTS is the higher organization over the TSA and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]; as such, BTS was the appropriate agency to respond to the DHS/IG report.)
DHS/IG response: The air marshal position is designated as “high risk” and, as such, is a position that demands the highest degree of public trust. To that end, the DHS/IG maintains that previously applied adjudication standards were too lenient. To resolve this recommendation, BTS should provide us with a copy of the recently developed ICE suitability standards.
2. Marshal misconduct
DHS/IG findings: There were more than 750 reports of marshal misconduct, to include sleeping on duty and losing their weapons. Two cases amplify the concern:
- An air marshal charged with criminal misconduct was required by law to surrender his weapon, rendering him unable to perform his duty. TSA [Transportation Security Administration] disciplinary policy clearly states that off-duty egregious misconduct could result in an indefinite suspension without pay. Yet no disciplinary action was taken.
- Two air marshals were placed on administrative leave when marijuana usage was detected in a random drug test. TSA’s interim policy mandates removal with the first drug offense.
DHS/IG recommendation: Establish clear disciplinary policies for FAMS and ensure that they are implemented and enforced.
BTS response: BTS believes that actions taken by the FAMS were consistent, judicious and fair in administering penalties. In cases where termination was appropriate, the FAMS acted swiftly and decisively. For example, the FAMS terminated 101 air marshals and 32 more resigned in lieu of termination between March 2002 and March 2004.
DHS/IG response: BTS’ agreement to hold air marshals to the same standards as other federal law enforcement officers within ICE is responsive. To resolve this recommendation, BTS should provide the DHS/IG with a copy of the disciplinary policy, and documentation stipulating that this policy applies to Federal Air Marshals and that all air marshals are apprised of this policy.
3. Fitness for duty
DHS/IG findings: Since Sept. 11, 2001, no operational air marshals have completed an annual medical examination. In addition, FAA medical standards require that all air marshals participate in a rigorous field office physical fitness program. While individual field offices encourage air marshals to exercise, FAMS management doe not conduct a formal physical fitness program.
DHS/IG recommendation: Require completion of annual medical examinations; clarify and enforce a structured physical fitness program.
BTS response: Agree. A program of mandatory medical examinations was implemented in March 2004.
DHS/IG response: Provide a copy of the policy and a timetable of when the required medical examinations will be completed. (ASW note: DHS/IG officials said they noticed that the response did not address physical fitness training and chose not to make an issue of it.)
If there is an object lesson in all this, it may be the timeless caution that whenever numbers are increased dramatically, extra attention is needed to maintain quality control. Melissa Howard, who directed the DHS/IG report, told ASW, “We were aware that the FAM program ramped up a lot.” In fact, she explained, that was one of the reasons why the DHS/IG reviewed the program’s progress.
“We expect an action plan in November and will follow up,” Howard said.
(ASW note: The full DHS/IG report on FAMS may be viewed at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_04-32_0804.pdf) >> Howard, e-mail [email protected] <<