“Little progress has been made” in developing an integrated approach to combating in-flight fires, according to a Feb. 26 speech by Wendy Tadros, member of the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada. She was speaking with reference to the Swissair Flight 111 investigation by the TSB. The inquiry into that crash produced some 23 recommendations, many of which focused on the hazard posed by flammable materials in aircraft and other shortcomings in doctrine, training and equipment for dealing with fire (see ASW, April 7, 2003).
“To be sure, airline safety has been enhanced,” she said. “Important upgrades, for example, have been made to flammability standards for aircraft materials.” Tadros was referring to the improved and more demanding radiant heat and direct flame test promulgated last year by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to qualify thermal acoustic insulation materials.
“But more work needs to be done,” Tadros added, going on to outline her immediate concern:
“It will take many years for the airline industry to eliminate all flammable materials on aircraft. We’re okay with that – it’s realistic to factor in economic realities, and to allow time for technological advances.
“But there are other more immediate steps one can take to mitigate the risk of fire onboard. We would like to see the industry adopt an integrated, comprehensive firefighting strategy for crews.
“Operators believe the industry is capable of developing such a plan, but [they] have been hesitant to initiate change on their own.
“As a result, little progress has been made in this area, despite the important findings uncovered during our investigation.
“It now falls to regulatory bodies such as Transport Canada and the Federal Aviation Administration in the U.S. to institute mandatory policies on firefighting in order for meaningful change to come about.”
The firefighting strategy Tadros and other TSB officials have in mind is embodied in five recommendations issued by the board in December 2000. (See ASW, Dec. 11, 2000). The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) forwarded the Canadian recommendations to the FAA, but did not issue them as board recommendations. However, the NTSB has issued a number of recommendations related directly the Swissair Flight 111 accident, notably for improved cockpit voice and flight data recorders. In addition, the NTSB has issued recommendations based on other accidents with similar fire-fighting issues identified by the Canadians. The response to these recommendations is distinctly mixed. Based on the demonstrated difficulty in achieving piecemeal improvements, the kind of strategic and integrated improvement the Canadians are seeking could lie many years ahead.
A TSB official said there is particular concern about aircraft vulnerability to in-flight fire in three areas: the cockpit, the electronics and equipment (E&E) bay, and hidden spaces throughout the aircraft. The overall mindset, this official said, is that “any smoke situation is to be considered out of control until proven otherwise.” The strategy propounded by the board is to give crews the detection, training and other tools to help “prove otherwise,” or fight the fire while preparing to land the aircraft.
The TSB official pointed to Swiss International Air Lines, the corporate successor to the former Swissair, and the steps it has taken – notably the “Modification Plus” program for remaining MD-11s, which provides detection and suppression in inaccessible areas (see ASW, July 30, 2001).
Also, Swiss has implemented more firefighting training, involving both cockpit and cabin crews.
Some of the elements of the TSB strategy were proposed in 1999 by Capt. Ken Adams, who urged a new and comprehensive approach to cockpit and cabin fire safety (see ASW, Nov. 1, 1999).
(For the full text of the TSB’s recommendations and the rationale thereof, see http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/saf_actions/Recommendations/FireRecs_2000dec4.asp )
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A Comprehensive Firefighting Strategy Five building blocks propounded by the TSB
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Recommendation (TSB Rec. #)
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Status (TSB does not maintain an official status of the type employed by the NTSB. Status below as determined by ASW from multiple sources.)
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| Review the adequacy of in-flight firefighting as a whole, to ensure that aircraft and crews are provided with a system whose elements are complementary and optimized to provide the maximum probability of detecting and suppressing any in-flight fire. (A00-16) | FAA is developing an advisory circular (AC) to provide guidance for aircrews for dealing with in-flight fires (to include in hidden areas). It is yet to be seen how comprehensive that guidance will be. |
| Review the methodology for establishing designated fire zones within the pressurized portion of the aircraft, with a view to providing improved detection and suppression capability. (A00-17) | FAA has embarked on programs to improve the means of detecting in-flight fires. |
| Take action to ensure that industry standards reflect a philosophy that when odor/smoke from an unknown source appears in an aircraft, the most appropriate course of action is to prepare to land the aircraft expeditiously. (A00-18) | Contingent on forthcoming AC. |
| Ensure that emergency checklist procedures for odor/smoke of unknown origin can be completed in a timeframe that will minimize the possibility of an in-flight fire being ignited or sustained. (A00-19) | Contingent on actions of individual airlines. |
| Review in-flight firefighting standards including procedures, training, equipment, and accessibility to spaces such as the attic area to ensure that crews are prepared to respond immediately and in a coordinated manner to any in-flight fire. (A00-20) | Part of overall FAA research effort. For a review of considerable activity in this area, see http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/reports/report.stm |
| Source: Recommendations, TSB | |
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Capturing Critical Data and Fighting Fire Related NTSB recommendations
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Recommendation (NTSB Rec. #)
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Status
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Related to the Swissair Flight 111 case directly
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| Retrofit all aircraft after Jan. 1, 2005, with cockpit voice and flight data recorders (CVR/FDR) capable of recording for two hours and fitted with an independent power source. (A-99-016) | OPEN – UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE |
| All aircraft manufactured after Jan. 1, 2003, to be equipped with two combination CVR/FDR recording systems, one close to the cockpit and one as far aft as possible, to include independent power backup and capable of capturing controller-pilot data link messages. (A-99-017) | OPEN – UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE |
| Require that CVRs, FDRs and redundant combination flight recorders be powered from separate generator busses. (A-99-018) | OPEN – UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE |
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Recommendations based on other accidents with similar issues to those identified by the Canadians
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| Issue an advisory circular (AC) describing the need for crewmembers to take immediate and aggressive action in response to signs of an in- flight fire. The AC should stress that fires are often hidden behind interior panels, which a crewmember may have to remove or otherwise gain access to the area behind in order to apply extinguishing agent to the source of the fire. (A-01-083) | OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE |
| Require participation in firefighting drills involving actual or simulated fires during crewmember recurrent training and that those drills involve realistic scenarios on recognizing potential signs of, locating and fighting hidden fires. (A-01-085) | OPEN – UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE |
| Develop and require procedures or modifications enabling crewmembers to gain access to areas behind interior panels for the purpose of applying extinguishing agent to hidden fires. Evaluate the feasibility of equipping interior panels of new and existing airplanes with ports or some other means to apply extinguishing agent behind interior panels. (A-01-086) | OPEN – UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE (Note: the FAA is researching the utility of access ports into which portable fire extinguishers could be inserted to spray agent onto a hidden fire |
| Source: NTSB | |