The Chief Defense Scientist of Australia’s Department of Defense this week said while legislative changes to U.S. restrictions on sharing certain technologies would be “the biggest shift” for the AUKUS agreement, the culture of the countries’ bureaucracies need to change as well to have an effect.
“There’s no question that if the congressional changes and the respective changes in each of our AUKUS nations needed to get that in place go through, that will be the biggest shift we’ve experienced in our abilities to operationalize our alliance,” Chief Defense Scientist Tanya Monro said during a Center for a New American Security event on Sept. 20.
The 2021 tripartite agreement among Australia, the U.K. and U.S. is divided into increased technology cooperation to help provide Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines as well as a series of unrelated technologies like artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and quantum computing, called Pillar 2. Munro’s comments were focused on Pillar 2 efforts.
Monro said what has been critical in building momentum for AUKUS cooperation is not to see this as some new separate activity, or a bolt-on, “but actually seeing it as a way of getting after things that are priorities for each of our nations.”
This means each country’s systems operating at different scales with different financial years can be helpful because it emphasizes the change and unusualness of this effort.
“That, for me, is part of the shift that’s helping us now get some momentum,” Monro said.
She also argued that the intent of senior leaders in all three governments is important, but the reforms to regulations like International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) can help “drive that through the system, that’s what we need.”
Monro urged a “really mature conversation about the advantage to the U.S. from this ITAR reform” that emphasized the advantage in AUKUS helped broaden the government’s base of innovation, science and technology, supply chains and sustainment opportunities down into the culture of organizations.
“Really recognize that senior intent is not enough unless it is driven through the systems that deliver on that senior intent. It is a cultural matter,” she added.
Monro said she has had personal experience with cultural skepticism of international cooperation with an ally like Australia, despite the official rules of a project.
“I’ve had up close and personal experience where leaders responsible for certain areas of technology have given direction that certain fields of endeavor are not to be NOFORN – that Australia, for example, is to be brought in because we have something to offer that will help accelerate what the U.S. is doing. And yet, it still gets strangled, and frozen, because of very rational human fears of people within the system, that they will be personally liable and accountable for those decisions that go against the culture and precedent of keeping other nations out.”
Monro also said while there is a long history of co-development between the U.S. and Australia on certain systems, including the Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo and some hypersonic technologies, they have not yet had that level of success in co-production and co-sustainment.
However, she argued now Australia is a good target for co-sustainment with the U.S., beyond submarine issues.
“Australia’s location in the world in one of the most dynamic and changing part of our geopolitical parts of the world makes us incredibly well positioned to lean into areas such as co-sustainment.”