By Ann Roosevelt
VIRGINIA BEACH, Va.–Technology is not the solution to improved joint warfighting, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) deputy commanding general said last week.
“Joint warfighting is a human endeavor, technology is a key enabler but not a silver bullet. It is not an engineered solution,” Army Lt. Gen. John Wood, JFCOM deputy commander, said in an address to the Joint Warfighting 2008 conference co-sponsored by the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association International and the U.S. Naval Institute, in coordination with JFCOM.
The conference and its nearly 6,000 attendees came here to shape warfighting strategies and determine if the warfighter was heading in the proper direction in the current and future environment.
The military faces a thinking, adapting enemy and an array of concerns different than those immediately after 9/11,Wood said. Concerns include that a change in administration will put a set of new eyes on current policy and plans. Also, a new Quadrennial Defense Review is ramping up and a review of roles and missions is under way. Add to that the looming end of supplemental funding and changes in the budget process.
Reflecting on these issues means taking another look at the options to ensure Defense Department capabilities are dominant, relevant and ready in the joint domain, he said.
Trend lines show the complexity of the adaptive enemy leads to persistent conflict, where counterinsurgency is the norm, not the exception, in the future, he said.
JFCOM Commander Marine Gen. James Mattis’ guidance noted that “jointness is not a natural state, but does deserve our best efforts,” Wood said. A given is that future wars will be fought with partners.
The military must improve its capability in the irregular fight and maintain conventional dominance. Leveraging the strengths of human endeavor and exploiting opportunities leads to initiative and advantage, he said. Decentralized execution promotes collaboration, he said.
“Those who get it, are the youngsters,” Wood said. Strategic art is being played out in “the rough canyons of the urban setting,” not in comfortable parlors at home.
The aim is to find the enemy, fix and finish him.
Critical at the strategic level is how to leverage military and link it to industry and the rest of government.
It is “linking strategic direction and key partners to operational action,” he said. “It’s net-enabled and leader-centric.
Strategic guidance flows down to the joint force commander who is linked to partners on his left and right: the interagency, non-governmental organizations and coalition members, and down to the land, air, sea and special operations components below.
Strategic integration with those partners accomplishes operational ends, but it is not simple, Wood said. Doctrine, organization and institutional support does not always match operational realities. Manning realities are also complex.
Each service develops force generating models to match war plans, but they don’t necessarily take a joint view. For example, Wood said, there are 24 joint task forces in the U.S. Central Command area, all with unique requirements.
Of 210,000 troops deployed, 20 percent, or 40,000, are “filling unforeseen unique requirements,” Wood said. There are expanding skill sets and new competencies such as Provisional Reconstruction Teams and counter-IED and security forces.
The signal being sent as Wood sees it is that joint force requirements are an element of the force-sizing construct. And these requirements are vital when DoD is considering the proper size of the services. “You can’t simply look at war plans and say it equals execution.”
Taking a look at tough problems, Wood said he can break them down into smaller pieces looking at organization, capabilities and means at hand, processes, what authorities or changes in law or regulation are required, and how service culture must change.
Solutions begin to lie in agility, balance and flexibility, Wood said. The future is now, “more than many would like to admit,” and “the future is joint, campaigning and costly.” Trends must be recognized early. Training must be to joint capability requirements of both irregular and conventional war.
Management methods and policies must be promoted that provide visibility, flexibility and agility to the force. The right lexicon, capabilities based language should be adopted, and integration and interoperability are a management imperative.
“One aspect of our future we can’t overlook or underemphasize is our own human capital,” Wood said.