Missile Defense Agency director Vice Adm. Jim Syring said on Wednesday that the Tuesday test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System was realistic and replicated a real threat the agency is worried about in contrast with past failures.
The briefing came a day after the first successful test of the GMD System intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class target, designated Flight Test Ground-Based Interceptor (FTG)-15 (Defense Daily, May 30).
Syring confirmed the test ICBM-class target included decoys and “this is exactly the scenario we would expect to occur during an actual operational engagement.”
“It actually replicated — without going into classified details — an operational scenario that we’re concerned about.”
However, he did not go in to detail about the sophistication of the decoys.
“I can’t go into the specifics of that. I’m saying as much as I can to even say there were decoys in the test. But it’s not the first time that we’ve tested with decoys in countermeasures.”
He noted the upgraded Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) used in the test is production representative of what will be in the eight additional interceptors set to be installed at Fort Greely, Alaska this year. Adding those eight will bring the GMD system up to 44 total GBIs.
The GBI in the test included an upgrade to the kill vehicle, the Capability Enhancement-II (CE-11) Block 1, which uses newly-designed thrusters that make course adjustments in the vehicle’s final trajectory before making contact with the target. Previous thrusters caused vibrations that interfered with the kill vehicle correctly hitting the target.
Thomas Karako, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an analysis the test “virtually guarantees that the deployments will go forward. This number could potentially grow beyond 44 to keep pace with the threat.”
Syring said based on all the data the MDA has received so far from the test, this represents a “critical milestone in the life of the program” and that all indications are that the systems performed as designed with a direct hit and “a complete obliteration.”
However, the MDA will analyze and model the test data for 30 days to confirm this for a final judgment.
The test in total cost $224 million, Syring said.
Syring confirmed the test met both its primary and secondary objectives and that the lessons learned will allow the MDA to continue to mature the system and stay ahead of the ballistic missile threats it is geared towards. He claimed the interceptor keeps pace or outpaces the threat that North Korean or Iranian ballistic missiles could pose to the U.S. through 2020.
The test program is based on forecasts and projections by the intelligence community from threat actors “and where they may be with reentry vehicle technology, with countermeasure technology, with rocket motor technology,” the director said.
In contrast, skeptics of the program focused on how limited this result is and questioned how representative it is of an eventual ICBM threat from North Korea.
Philip Coyle, senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and former head of the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation admitted the success was important for the program and those who worked on it.
However, this was only the second success in a row “which is significant but only two hits out of the last five attempts; that is, only a 40 percent success rate since early 2010. In school, 40 percent isn’t a passing grade. The GMD program has a long way to go,” Coyle said in a statement.
Coyle said this was a three-year expensive baby step and based on the testing record the U.S. cannot rely on the GMD to protect the U.S. from a long-range missile. Coyle highlighted this test had a slower closing velocity/closure rate than an intercept would be between a North Korean ICBM and a U.S. interceptor while a higher closing velocity would be more challenging.
“The mock enemy target was only barely of ICBM range, and slower than an ICBM from North Korea to Los Angeles would be (if North Korea had a missile of that range, which it doesn’t),” Coyle said.
Karako underscored several factors contributed to the high failure rate in the last 17 GBI intercept tests. This includes inconsistencies in kill vehicle manufacturing and anomalies in test-only equipment.
Syring also spoke about upcoming kill vehicle testing. The redesigned kill vehicle (RKV) will have a flight test by the end of 2019, which will be the next step in improving reliability and performance as part of a “stepwise progression” in reliability and countering the missile threat.
Karako said some of the technologies demonstrated on the test interceptor will likely be part of the RKV. The RKV is expected to replace most of the current kill vehicle fleet over the next decade.
Beyond the RKV, Syring highlighted funding for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) in the fiscal year 2018 Defense Department budget request and they are targeting it to be operational by 2025. Raytheon [RTN] is managing both the RKV and MOKV.
The next test of the GBI with this kill vehicle is set to occur in the August-September 2018 timeframe and will be a salvo test of two GBI’s launched against another ICBM-class target. A salvo means the GMD will launch multiple interceptors at the same target to increase the likelihood of success.
Syring touched on what degree this test was scripted, a frequent criticism of the GMD program.
He said the GMD interceptor was not notified when the target was launched and that everything they did in the test was operationally realistic in terms of the timeframe that detection would happen. However, Syring said the MDA testers knew the test would be Tuesday and the general timeframe.
“But that is due in almost 100 percent fact of the safety constraints that we’re up against in the Pacific Ocean. We’re launching an interceptor 100 miles north of the LAX, we’re launching an interceptor that’s flying thousands of miles past Hawaii; and that requires us to shut down large parts of the ocean in terms of mariners, ship traffic and air traffic and its infeasible to do it any other way.”
Syring said despite the restrictions, the tasking provided to the interceptor would have been provided to the system and specific interceptors if it was a North Korean launch.
Norm Tew, Boeing vice president and program director for Ground-based Midcourse Defense further endorsed this view of scripting in a press call. He said the word ‘scripted’ infers the GMD system had knowledge of test specifics before it occurred, which is not true in this case.
Tew added aspects of the test needed to be controlled because of the numerous safety issues involved in this kind of test. This includes accommodating space assets and orbits, commercial and military air flight corridors, seagoing vessels, and more.
Syring noted the test was within the expected range, altitude, and speed of an ICBM. The target’s speed was “very, very close” to “what we predict an ICBM to fly at.”
Karako said there is room for more challenging and realistic tests but “the complexity and realism of GMD testing has increased considerably over the past two decades.”
Boeing [BA] is the prime contractor for GMD; Orbital ATK [OA] is the main contractor for the boost vehicle; and Raytheon produces the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, supporting sensor AN/TPY-2 radar, and the sea-based X-band radar. Aerojet Rocketdyne [AJRD] builds the liquid Divert and Altitude Control System and Alternative Divert Thrusters on the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle to maneuver it to the position needed to destroy the target. Northrop Grumman [NOC] is the contractor for fire control and communications.