Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer’s Strategic Readiness Review focused on four major recommendation types to prevent future Naval mishaps due to longstanding issues: focusing on readiness as a priority, more realistically matching supple and demand in naval forces, streamline command and control structures for better responsibility and accountability, and foster a culture of a learning organization.
Spencer picked former Defense Business Board Chairman Michael Bayer and former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Gary Roughead to lead the review team, and they consulted with companies like Boeing [BA], British Petroleum North America [BP], Crowley Maritime Corp., government offices like the Naval Inspector General and Naval Safety Center, and various former defense department officials and analysts.
Spencer formed the independent review group earlier this year with a larger view of the Navy than previous reviews and investigations of surface force mishaps over the past year (Defense Daily, Sept. 5).
While the review team noted problems cannot be traced to any single policy or leadership decisions, the cumulative effects of numerous “well-meaning decisions designed to achieve short-term operational effectiveness and efficiencies” ended up producing unintended consequences that then degraded necessary long-term operational capability.
At the same time, the review noted Navy leaders added more risk to accomplish missions while unintentionally altering the service’s culture and distorting fleet readiness.
The problems start with how the Navy has maintained about the same 90-100 deployed ship force despite a sharp decrease in the over 500 active ships in the early 1980s to 279 active ships today. The review argues that essentially double the percentage of ships are now deployed compared to the end of the Cold War.
“The net result has been a dramatic increase in the operating tempo of individual ships, and accompanying reductions in the time available to perform maintenance, training, and readiness certification,” the report said.
To meet demands to get the most out of its resources and personnel, the fleet made short-term tradeoffs on training, manning, and maintenance. Although these decisions were needed to get near term jobs done, it increased risks over time.
“Over time, this deviation from accepted standards increased, became normalized, and subsequently institutionalized. This sustained acceptance of risk fits a pattern consistent with the “normalization-of-deviation,” whereby individuals and organizations accept ever lower standards of performance as the new normal.”
The report said this kind of deviation happens in the private sector and in this case became common practice as Navy leadership accepted changes in readiness.
“Nowhere was this normalization more apparent than in the 7th Fleet surface force where the Navy suffered the recent series of incidents.”
The review said changing the culture by restoring readiness is important but that given current congressional spending on the fleet, “military and civilian leaders must accept less Navy presence worldwide.”
The Navy also shifted responsibility for certifications and readiness to the operating fleet, which traded training for short-term operational needs “which further contributed to the overall readiness decline and increased stress on the crews.”
Therefore, ship workloads grew and work days and weeks expanded “to unsustainable levels” as the operational tempo increased with combat actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The report also pointed out that the Navy implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act did not properly preserve and prioritize critical skills development and training.
It said the Navy began to experience frequent reorganizations, replacing tightly aligned responsibility, authority, and accountability with redundancies into overlapping responsibilities and ambiguities.
“These reorganizations led to a growth in headquarters structures with misaligned authorities, complicated command and control responsibilities, and diffuse accountability structures.”
Navy readiness standards for training, certifications, maintenance availabilities and manning quality/levels are thoughtfully established but the review said “the Navy allowed these standards to erode to the point that they are nearly ineffective, especially in the case of Forward Deployed Naval Forces in Japan.”
The strategic review notably disagrees with the establishment of Naval Surface Group Western Pacific as an additional oversight layer, as recommended by the Comprehensive Review. That earlier review was led by Adm. Phil Davidson, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces, and directed by CNO Adm. John Richardson (Defense Daily, Nov. 2).
The Comprehensive Review recommended introducing greater independence in readiness assessments by permanently establishing the group. Adm. Scott Swift, commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, formed the group in November “to address an organizational gap in Forward Deployed Naval Forces – Japan that allowed a culture to grow myopically focused on operations to the detriment of readiness” (Defense Daily, Nov. 2).
The Strategic Review said it agrees with the earlier report’s finding that there was ambiguity in command duties, responsibilities, and authorities. However, the new review said “standing up an additional oversight layer provides another headquarters staff and administrative control function that is likely to perpetuate ambiguous and conflicting authorities.”
It said there are already organizational structures in place within the type commander staff at Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific and its subordinate organizations for appropriate responsibility.
“The manpower used to establish Naval Surface Group Western Pacific, is better applied to fully and competently staffing the existing training commands and squadron staffs in the Western Pacific,” the report said.
In this respect, the review recommended the Secretary of the Navy direct a “clean sheet” review of the administrative chain of command in the service to most efficiently organize and man headquarters to generate sustainable readiness. It also seeks to reduce confusing bureaucracy by limiting the number of staff headquarters layers.
This aims to improve a bottom-up situational awareness of readiness “through shortened chains-of-command and reduced infrastructure for management oversight and compliance regime.”
Specifically, the report wants to disestablish Commander Pacific Fleet Detachment Commander Naval Surface Group Western Pacific and realign those billets to Afloat Training Groups or Destroyer Squadrons to focus talent on developing mastery of the naval profession.
The report also recommends reestablishing the 2nd Fleet as an operational and training fleet commander under U.S. Fleet Forces Command, modeling the 3rd Fleet. Such a change would “reduce overlap between administrative and operational responsibilities, and better respond to the changing security environment.”
It also recommends disestablishing and absorbing the 4th Fleet functions into a reestablished 2nd Fleet to look similar to the current 6th Fleet operation.
The report notes organizations need to be designed to anticipate and mitigate against fundamentally risky military operations. Individual accountability is insufficient and institutional accountability is needed to address changes factors early on. This is part of being a “learning organization.”
“Independent checks and balances must be in place and continually evaluated, thereby guarding against the “normalization-of-deviation” that has been the thread running throughout the Strategic Review.”