United States May Not Have Time, Until 2013-2015, Before Iran Develops Nuclear-Tipped ICBM
While some in Congress think the United States could cancel the European Missile Defense (EMD) program and substitute the sea-based Aegis/Standard Missile system, the ships still would require data from the EMD radar to be effective, the former Missile Defense Agency (MDA) director said.
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering III, who stepped down as MDA director in November, also said that intelligence estimates that Iran won’t develop nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) until 2013-2015 may prove to be wrong.
Even if the EMD program proceeded as scheduled, fully funded, instead of being canceled, it wouldn’t be built and operational before then.
“My concern,” Obering said, “is that we would still not have an operational site until the 2014 to 2015 time frame.” He spoke to defense journalists at a luncheon of the Center for Media and Security at a hotel in Washington.
He responded to a question from Space & Missile Defense Report, which noted that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, appearing separately before Senate and House panels, cited U.S. intelligence estimates that Iran wouldn’t have a missile capable of reaching Europe and Russia for two or three more years. Then, just a week later, Iran launched a satellite that 30 minutes later was over the United States.
As well, U.S. intelligence was caught by surprise when North Korea in the 1990s launched a missile that arced over Japan and fell into the sea. Intelligence also failed to predict the North Korean underground detonation of a nuclear bomb.
Thus the question is, how certain can lawmakers be if they rely on intelligence estimates that the EMD can be delayed because Iran isn’t expected to have nuclear-tipped ICBMs until 2013 to 2015?
Appearing with Obering at the luncheon was Dean Wilkening, director of the science program at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, who at times has taken a skeptical view on some missile defense issues.
But Wilkening agreed that if Congress decided to use Aegis ships to defend Europe against Iranian missiles, those ships likely would require data from a major land-based radar such as the EMD installation proposed for the Czech Republic. The EMD also would include interceptors in ground silos in Poland. Governments of both nations have assented to the EMD plan, but full legislative approvals still are pending. NATO also has endorsed the system.
“You probably do need a land-based radar,” Wilkening said. He also noted that the naval missile defense system would be able to act on a surge basis, but not on a permanent 24/7 mission assignment.
At least four ships would be needed at any time to provide the missile shield, Obering noted. Others have estimated it might be six ships. And currently there are just 18 U.S. surface combatant ships equipped with major Aegis upgrades to missile defense capabilities, and those 18 ships must fulfill all combatant commander requests for missions worldwide, not just near the Middle East.
Iran is unrelenting in its drive to develop world-class missile capabilities and nuclear weapons, Obering said. “They want to be seen as a player,” equal to the United States in military advancements, Obering said.
North Korea, too, is advancing its missile capabilities, Obering said.
While Pyongyang tested a Taepo Dong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile in 2006, and it failed shortly after launch, it is key that six short- and medium-range missiles succeeded in that massive multiple launch, Obering observed.
And recently, a large cylindrical object was seen being moved toward a new North Korean missile launching center.
“They’re continuing to make advances,” Obering said.
He estimated that North Korea, like Iran, is aiming to develop space-launch capabilities that would involve the same technologies as an ICBM.
While Wilkening said it is unclear what that cylindrical object on the rail car might be, he is concerned that North Korea clearly is working to develop advanced missile technologies. And there is the fear that North Korea could export its know-how to rogue states.
Obering also dismissed the assertions of ballistic missile defense opponents, who say no nation would dare launch a nuclear-tipped missile at a U.S. city.
On the one hand, smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States for a terrorist attack would be very difficult, Obering noted. Many foreign ports have devices to screen cargo containers bound for American ports to see whether they contain nuclear weapons.
But it would be a straightforward matter for terrorists to buy a nuclear weapon or two, and delivery missiles, and then mount them on a cargo ship, Obering observed.
Terrorists could launch the missiles from the ship, long before nearing U.S. waters, and then scuttle the ship, leaving an empty ocean. For U.S. policymakers, that leaves the question of “who are you going to retaliate against?” Obering asked.
If there is port security, which is being put in place now, but there is no effective multi-layered missile defense system, then a missile strike from the sea or a rogue nation “is probably the path they’re going to” take, he said.
Wilkening said that “if you leave yourself defenseless, that invites attack.”