Pilot Work Rules to Change

Pilot fatigue initiatives resulting from the Feb. 12 fatal crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 in Buffalo, NY were revealed at a House aviation subcommittee hearing on Sept. 23.

Among other things, Federal Aviation Administrator Randy Babbitt noted that “as a result of [the industry-wide call to action], our inspectors found that about two-thirds of the carriers operating under the traditional regulatory requirements for pilot training and checking (i.e. carriers that do not participate in an Advanced Qualification Program) had systems in place to identify and manage low-time flight crewmembers and those with persistent performance problems.”

And Regional Airline Association President Roger Cohen said “I am proud to announce that virtually all of RAA’s members – airlines transporting 98% of the passengers carried by RAA members – either have established or have committed to a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) safety program. For Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) the results are similar: Virtually all our members have implemented this valuable safety tool for their pilots, some of them having done so up to a decade ago. RAA has embarked on our own Strategic Safety Initiative (SSI) that aligns with the FAA’s efforts and the goals of this committee.” (See side bar below)

Babbitt believes the biggest factor affecting safety is professionalism in the workplace, quick to add the issue was not unique to pilots. “We cannot regulate professionalism. No matter how many rules, regulations, advisories, mandatory training sessions, voluntary training sessions, it still comes down to the individual pilot, mechanic, technician, or controller. We have not seen the required level of professionalism consistently from the aviation industry across the board. Although professionalism prevails in the vast majority of the aviation workforce, it is not uniform throughout the industry. The standards are the same, the training is the same, but the mentality is not the same, and this is what we have to change.”

However, he, as with all those who testified, also dodged the commuting issue. “One aspect of professionalism that needs further review is the professional responsibility of pilots to report for duty ready to fly,” he continued. “This can be a challenge for those who commute from one city to their work domicile in another. One of the things that requires further analysis is the effect commuting has on fatigue for crew members. As I have alluded to in the past, one of the challenges with commuting is that it is virtually impossible to regulate fatigue as it relates to commuting. Who can say that someone who commutes for an hour on the shuttle from DC to NY or a two-hour flight from Chicago, for that matter, arrives to work less rested than someone who lives in the greater NY metropolitan area, but drives three hours through a snowstorm from Connecticut to arrive at JFK?”

RAA agreed. “Let me note, once again, that safety is a shared responsibility,” Cohen told the committee. “It is the professional responsibility of every professional pilot, if he or she does not feel sufficiently well rested, to say so and not fly. Each of our member carriers has a non-punitive policy in place to allow a pilot to drop a trip if the pilot feels incapable of flying alertly. Backup flight crews are in place specifically for this purpose. Pilots must maintain this professional responsibility and ethical obligation to passengers and their fellow crewmembers to conduct themselves in a manner that ensures they are well rested.

“Oftentimes the fatigue issue is tied to pilot commuting,” he continued. “Some pilots choose to commute and live away from their crew base, which typically is the airport from which they will begin and end every flight assignment. Commuting is a common and long-standing practice among crewmembers at all airlines. It is one of the attractions of the profession. While many pilots commute, many others do not. Commuting is a life style choice; not a necessity dictated by economics. Commuting is a choice. That’s a perk of being a pilot. However, with perks come responsibility, and those who choose long commutes have a professional responsibility to their fellow crewmembers and to our customers to arrive at work properly rested.”

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) shared comments from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Call to Action (CTA) meetings held in the regions which indicated that not only are regionals continuing their “punitive” practices, but that solutions suggested in the meetings tend to put more of the onus on pilots rather than airline scheduling practices. Indeed, participating pilots even recommended that crew schedulers be licensed to new standards that take into account the fatigue science surrounding how schedules contribute to the problem. They suggested the fault for fatigue should be laid at the feet of the FAA rather than the airlines because its regulations allow airlines to over schedule pilots. They complained that initiatives gleaned from the Call to Action were to be adopted on a strictly voluntary basis with no deadline and no follow up.

“Sadly, we continue to encounter airline managements, and sometimes even FAA inspectors, who remain convinced that the way to deal with safety issues identified through these programs is to punish pilots or other employees for mistakes made on the job,” ALPA President Captain John Prater said. “ASAP and FOQA programs will fail if used as a disciplinary tool instead of being used as intended to promote a safety culture.

“The managements at Pinnacle and Colgan have not changed their ways,” he continued. “The management at Trans States Airlines hasn’t changed their ways. I’ve been asking our pilots to report the type of pressures that managements place upon them, threatening their job, giving them discipline … not just for fatigue or sick calls.” He also said that such reports indicate that airlines are punishing captains reporting maintenance issues. The Wall Street Journal cast the issue as part of larger “labor-management rifts” that are impeding new safety efforts.

Calling ALPA charge completely false, Pinnacle Spokesperson Joe Williams told the Associated Press Pinnacle and Colgan follow industry practices in its non-punitive policies. In fact, he said, its policies “allow pilots more freedom…than policies at some mainline carriers.” He further reiterated that, while pilots are required to fly a certain number of monthly hours, payment is not reduced if they call in fatigued. “As for not writing up maintenance problems, that’s a ridiculous charge and is contrary to our first priority, which is the safety of our passengers and crew.”

Trans States spokesman Fred Oxley said the carrier’s policy is that there is no penalty for pilots who say they are too tired to fly. “I don’t know what Capt. Prater may be referring to,” Oxley told AP. “If he has particular instances, we’d be happy to look at that, but on the surface of his comments I see no merit.”

Jeffrey Skiles, vice president of the Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA), representing over 28,000 pilots at major, cargo and corporate aviation departments, went further. “While the actions of these two pilots during the performance of their normal duty led to this tragedy, they were as much victims of the state of the nation’s airline pilot industry demographics as the passengers who entrusted their lives to Continental Airlines,” he told the committee. “They were simply asked to fly a complex aircraft in challenging conditions that their limited experience level had not prepared them for.”

He criticized current efforts to reduce pilot fatigue. “While the FAA will be the final arbiter and Administrator Babbitt has promised changes in regulation, the current discussion is trending towards increasing the number of hours a pilot can fly in a duty period,” he said. “There are no studies that conclude that increased workload contribute to fatigue. Industry took the opportunity of a nation that is demanding that pilot fatigue issues be fixed, to attempt to rewrite the rules in favor of increasing productivity and thereby putting pilots at a higher risk of fatigue.”

He called on Congress to provide direction and oversight on the regulations that will come out of the FAA ARC process. Skiles called for the passage of The Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009 (HR 3371) saying it would increase the experience base of US commercial pilots as it would require flight experience commensurate with the position including minimum 1500 flight time, 500 hour cross country, 400 hours night flying and 75 hours of instrument.

In addition, the bill would:

• Require the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure that pilots are trained on stall recovery.
• Establish a pre-employment screening regime.
• Require airlines to establish pilot mentoring programs.
• Create a Pilot Records Database so airlines can see a pilot’s comprehensive record.
• Directs the FAA to update and implement new scheduling rules to manage fatigue risk.

Skiles also recommended a stepped licensing approach be adopted for pilots such as other industries have. “Architects must complete demanding educational requirements consisting of art and engineering, yet even after completion of formal training, they are required to serve a three year apprenticeship before attaining full licensure. Engineers must have 4 years of work experience before being allowed to sit for the Professional Engineers exam. The vast responsibilities placed on the shoulders of airline pilots and the expectation for safe, professional travel require no less from airline pilots.”

Babbitt seemed to agree. “One of the things that the Call Action has also shown a light on is the issue of varying operational experience,” he said. “We do not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience, without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations. For example, a newly-certificated commercial pilot with the minimum number of hours might be limited to certain activities until he or she could accumulate the type of experience deemed potentially necessary to serve as a first officer for an air carrier. Such experience would need to include training and operational experience in the multi-pilot environment, as well as training and exposure to icing, high altitude operations and other areas common to commercial air carrier operations.”

Skiles contested contentions of pilot shortages, saying changes to the job at airlines have driven them elsewhere. “There is not now a shortage of qualified pilots, they just aren’t flying airliners,” he said. “They are now flying for corporate flight departments or fractional ownership companies, they are flying cargo or charter, or they have left the industry altogether for other pursuits as they seek a living wage for themselves and their families. Airline flying is not a desirable career for experienced professional pilots. When HR 3371 becomes law, new hire requirements will be as they were previously; at acceptable levels. If the industry no longer is willing to provide the safety net required, Congress needs to act to do so.

ALPA agreed. “Economics and other factors have significantly eroded pilot morale and undermined the career,” Prater, told the House transportation aviation subcommittee, joining Skilling in urging the passage of HR 3371 which, it said, “will make a profound difference in the selection, training, education and safety of future airline pilot professionals.”

Meanwhile, the FAA, Air Transport Association (ATA) and the RAA provided detailed analysis of the safety initiatives resulting from both the Colgan accident and the Call to Action. (See side bar below) Indeed, one can’t help but be impressed by all the progress made. Administrator Randy Babbitt provided the best report card, though, which not only outlined the CTA meetings but reported out all the solid actions taken since then, promising a complete report by December 31.

Babbitt discussed the agency’s new Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), which is charged with developing a rule for airline Safety Management Systems (SMS). SMS was regarded by all who testified as a key to improving airline industry safety. “I think that we need to see greater use of the tools at hand like safety management systems across the board,” he told the committee. “It is often difficult to spot a trend with a slope that has only three data points on it. Safety management systems can help us plot more points and produce better information to help us make the right safety decisions. When people know that they can raise their hand and say, ‘Hey, I think there’s a problem here,’ it is then, and only then, that we are able to move forward in safety. If you have a situation where someone raises a hand and then is punished for doing so, all you have done is encourage silence. When you make silence the rule, when sweeping issues under the rug becomes the status quo, you have a recipe for disaster.”

But mentoring programs, he said, continue to be the most challenging aspect of all the suggestions emerging from the Colgan accident. “Still, these discussions have produced some interesting and potentially promising ideas,” he said, listing some of the ideas including exploring mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs. He also said major and regional partners could set up Strategic Councils within a family of carriers (mainline and regional partner(s)), noting this approach could lead to individual as well as corporate mentoring relationships. Finally, he suggested using Professional Standards Committee Safety Conferences to provide opportunities for two-way mentoring which he called “a very good reminder that good ideas are not unique to larger mainline carriers.”

ALPA agreed. “Mentoring of new pilots is essential, and inexperienced pilots need additional initial operating experience,” it said, “A captain’s leadership training is needed for their own performance and to help them mentor others. Performance of mentoring pilots should be standardized with programs established for that purpose.”

ATA, once again dodged the bullet in having major airline code-sharing partners take more responsibility for the safety of the regional counterparts.

“The bedrock principle in civil aviation is that the entity to which the FAA has issued a certificate is solely responsible for its activities,” ATA’s James May told the house panel. “Whether that entity is an air carrier, an airman or a dispatcher, that responsibility cannot be delegated or assumed by others. That principle avoids any confusion about ultimate responsibility, an absolutely essential consideration in promoting safety. It is a principle that dates back to 1938, when Congress created the Civil Aviation Authority, the predecessor of the FAA. As separate regulated entities, regionals are independent of mainline airlines. As I noted previously, they hold operating authority that the FAA has granted them. The FAA certificates regionals under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121. This means that the certificate holder – the regional airline – maintains the responsibility for, and direct control of, its operations and safety programs. The FAA has the mandate to assure compliance with Part 121 and other FAR requirements.

“We should also remember that in the mid-1990s, in evaluating the need for improvements in the regulatory structure under which commuter airlines – the former term for regional airlines – operated, the FAA responded, with the support of ATA and its members, by requiring them to adhere to FAR Part 121, the same regulation under which mainline airlines operate,” May continued. “Moreover, the Department of Transportation, for more than a decade, has required in 14 CFR Part 257 that code-share arrangements be disclosed to customers before they purchase a ticket. This ‘operated by’ language underscores the importance that the government has recognized in maintaining the distinction between the mainline airline and the regional airline.”

ALPA, of course, disagreed and discussed the impact of code-sharing relationships, using safety as the hook to reiterate its complaints about the changes in the industry and pilot outsourcing through regional airline capacity purchase agreements. Indeed, it continued to hammer on the safety-tied-to-profits issue, despite the fact that code-sharing contracts provide a healthy profit margin for regionals who raked in great profits between 2002 and 2007 and continue to be profitable for the most part despite the economic crisis. But, ALPA is right that majors are looking at those results with envy and figuring out ways to “share the risk” as described at this year’s RAA meeting in Salt Lake. The impact is already being seen but will become more transparent as new contracts are cut in the coming years.

“Before the practice of code-sharing or FFD with regional partners, all flying was done by the pilots of an airline on a single pilot-seniority list,” said Prater. “The pilots of the airline were trained to and met the same higher-than-minimum regulatory standards. A safety benefit is derived from all flying being done from a single pilot-seniority list because it requires that first officers fly with many captains and learn from their experience and wisdom before becoming captains themselves. Several major airlines use multiple, regional vendor carriers to continually drive down their costs, but that practice harms safety because first officers can become captains within a year at the vendor airline and fail to gain the experience and judgment needed to safely act in that capacity.

“Code-share and Fee-for-Departure (FFD) agreements typically result in the mainline carriers exerting a great deal of pressure on the regional airlines to provide their service at the lowest possible price,” he continued. “As a result, the overriding concern by the regional carriers has become lowering costs to today’s substandard levels to prevent being replaced by another airline at the end of their contract. Most recently, some larger regional carriers have subcontracted with smaller regional airlines to operate these routes for them. In some extreme cases, airlines have outsourced a majority of their routes to regional airlines with pilots having as little as 250 hours of experience while the mainline carrier furloughed its own pilots who possessed more than a decade of experience in the industry. This resulted in replacing experienced pilots with low-experience pilots flying for the low-paying regional operator, all under the livery of an established brand. Another cost-cutting tactic used by regional vendor airlines is endemic short-staffing, which leads to pilot pushing, fewer pilots flying more and more hours per month, and a resultant reduction in safety margins.”

The RAA provided its blueprint for action but failed to report out at the detailed level offered by Babbitt. However, its biggest nugget was the fact that the industry was adding Flight Operations Quality Assurance Programs to its safety arsenal, something called for by National Transportation Safety Board Member Robert Sumwalt a year ago. However, its initiatives seem long on study and short on action.

The House committee members should be pleased with industry action taken with lightening-like speed. However, as Prater pointed out, “we have a tendency to work hard to identify issues and solutions but we are slow to implement those solutions voluntarily.”

Safety Initiatives

RAA

• Flight and Duty ARC Participated in ARC. While the rulemaking process is just beginning, it is hopeful, but confident the new rule will be based both on the best available fatigue science and on the industry’s extensive experience.
• Strategic Safety Initiative – The initiative is a focused effort to identify industry best safety practices and trends, to accelerate the process of reviewing NTSB recommendations, and to provide the latest fatigue science and countermeasures.
• Review Safety Procedures – Formed a task force comprised of safety directors and operations directors from the regional airlines to review safety procedures, paying particular attention to any issue or procedure cited by the NTSB as a contributing factor in any accident. This standing RAA committee will hold its initial meeting in November and we anticipate keeping this subcommittee and the FAA apprised of our activities.
• Study Fatigue Risk In collaboration with Washington State University’s Sleep and Performance Research Center, will be assessing the level of fatigue risk associated with typical regional airline pilot schedules. The mechanics of the study are still being developed; however the assessment will include field testing, identification of unique fatigue factors affecting regional airline pilot performance and alertness, and identification of countermeasures to mitigate the adverse effects of these factors. Although there has been significant fatigue research, most of that work has focused on long-haul routes and these studies will build on the existing research that is applicable to the regional airline flight environment.
• Additionally, although Fatigue Risk Management Programs (FRMS) are new to the industry, it also launched a study to determine the feasibility and practicality of developing an industry FRMS for the regional airlines. Conceivably, this effort could make cutting edge fatigue risk assessments available to even the smallest airlines by pooling the resources across many airlines, small and large.
• Fatigue Awareness Management Program This component of our Strategic Safety Initiative will also be conducted in collaboration with the Flight Safety Foundation. The objective will be to study accident information and the best practices for fatigue management, both inside and outside of the US airline industry. Goal is to develop an industry- leading program that will be available not only to RAA’s members, but also any other airline with similar operations.

Recommendations to Congress

• Establish a single database of pilot records to be maintained by the FAA to enable airlines to access critical, real-time information about pilot check rides, thereby improving the process of recruiting, hiring, and training new pilots. While our members try to utilize this information today, it takes weeks if not months to access.
• Conducting random fatigue tests on pilots to help ensure that pilots are indeed rested before flying.
• Extending the background check timeframe to the last 10 years of a pilot’s flying record. Under current law, an airline conducting a background check on a pilot can only review the last five years of the pilot’s safety records, qualifications, and training.
• Using cockpit voice recordings for accident prevention as opposed to their only current utilization as an accident investigation tool. RAA clearly understands the sensitive privacy issues involved with access to the CVRs. Similar to ASAP and other diagnostic preventative safety programs, an initiative permitting random, non-punitive audits could provide valuable information. The alternative is to maintain the tombstone mentality that surrounds CVRs.
• Improving check ride tracking and analysis to ensure all pilots are up to par. Every airline pilot is required to pass frequent check rides during his or her airline service, and pilots cannot fly until they have successfully completed their required check rides. We believe FAA and the airlines may be able to increase the level of safety through a more detailed analysis of check rides over the entirety of a pilot’s career.
• The multi-part Strategic Safety Initiative will look at human factors that have led to accidents in order to avoid incidents in the future and push for new advances in aviation safety. It is an ongoing effort and we will continue to keep you updated on our progress and share our findings with both this Subcommittee.

ATA

FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan Resulting from Colgan

• Fatigue Rulemaking: The FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to develop recommendations on revising flight- and duty-time regulations for flight crew members. The ARC met weekly from its kickoff on July 15 until its conclusion on Sep. 1. While the extremely compressed schedule prevented resolution of all issues, the ARC submitted recommendations to the FAA that were science-based, accommodate various operating models, align with international guidelines and reflect the vast operating experience of U.S. air carriers.
• Commuting: An issue that arose from the Buffalo accident and was debated within the ARC is that of flight crew member commuting. The ARC concluded that commuting is within the exclusive control of the pilot or copilot. It is expected, and the law assumes, that they will report fit to work. The law provides for adequate rest opportunities and the air carrier responsibility is to schedule flight crew members within those limits. It is the responsibility of the crew member to inform the carrier if he/she is unable to fly because of fatigue, whether because of commuting or for any other reason. That is why Part 121 airlines staff reserve crew members.
• Focused Inspection Initiative: Airlines supported the FAA review of flight crew member training programs. The review ensured that air carriers have the ability to identify, track and manage low-time crew members and those who have failed evaluation events or demonstrate a repetitive need for additional training. The review also confirmed that air carrier training programs met regulatory standards.
• Commitment to Most Effective Practices: The FAA June 15 call to action brought together key airline and labor leaders to identify the most effective practices for improving airline safety. The session surfaced many of the complexities that exist in the relationship between mainline air carriers and their regional partners. More importantly, the participants identified and committed to adopting the most effective practices from across the industry, many of which have been in place at ATA-member airlines for years.
• Those commitments were reflected in letters to the FAA Administrator and included:
• Implementing a policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events
• Continuing to leverage flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) and aviation safety action programs (ASAP), including the capability to analyze the data and effectively use the information obtained
• Establishing periodic meetings between mainline airlines and their regional partners to review safety programs, share safety information and share most effective practices
• Regional Safety Forums: ATA members also partnered with regional airlines, labor associations and the FAA to lead a series of 12 regional safety forums around the country to share the results of the June 15 call to action. In addition to enabling a valuable exchange of safety information, these gatherings of key representatives from all Part 121 airlines generated a number of additional ideas for further safety enhancements.
• Labor Organizations: Industry acknowledged the critical role of labor organizations in ensuring professional behavior. ATA-member airlines continue to support the establishment of professional standards and a code of ethics. Labor organizations will continue to play a pivotal role in all aspects of airline safety and have committed to several initiatives focused on ensuring professional behavior and to support further strengthening of voluntary safety programs like ASAP and FOQA.
• Mentoring: Industry clearly recognizes the value of transferring expertise from seasoned flight crew members to those with less experience. Mentoring programs are widely used across the industry and are tailored to reflect the various cultures and needs of those particular airlines. Certain aspects of those programs identified as most effective practices were captured during the June 15 call to action and subsequent regional safety forums and are being integrated as appropriate into flight crew member training programs.
• Crew Training Requirements: Flight crew-member training programs in use at ATA-member airlines are among the best in the world. The effectiveness of these programs stems from their ability to adapt to the specific operational challenges that exist within a specific airline’s operation. This approach, called Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) is grounded in existing regulations yet allows training curricula to evolve to meet current operational needs. The capability of AQP to be tailored to the specific needs of individual flight crew members is unique to AQP and is not envisioned in current regulations. ATA member airlines are concerned that the FAA-proposed changes to the training regulations, while well intended, may undermine the effectiveness of AQP. ATA filed extensive comments in response to the proposed rule and continues to work closely with FAA to ensure the ongoing viability of proven training programs enabled by AQP.

On-going Industry Safety Efforts

• The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) brings together stakeholders to improve safety performance by applying data-driven analyses to spot issues before accidents occur and to establish safety priorities. Increasing reliance on two industry-led safety programs, the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), which encourages voluntary reporting of safety issues and events that come to the attention of employees of certain certificate holders, and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program, which involves the collection and analysis of data recorded during flight to improve safety, have also added immeasurably to our knowledge. This empirical approach, coupled with the expertise and commitment of our frontline employees, provides the underpinning for industry-wide safety efforts.
• ATA has formed a Senior Advisory Task Force to address the matters raised during the recent NTSB hearing about the Buffalo accident. The task force is comprised of airline presidents, chief operating officers and their peers. It will ensure that our support of the FAA, airlines, unions and others is responsive, targeted and thorough.
• ATA members urge the adoption of effective Safety Management Systems (SMS) believing SMS will provide the foundation for the next leap forward in aviation safety and are committed to aggressive implementation as the guidelines are established.
• Resulting from the FAA findings of AD noncompliance by American and Southwest, the FAA convened a group of industry experts to review the AD development and compliance process. The group analyzed the specific breakdowns that resulted in the mass cancellations but, more importantly, developed a set of recommendations designed to improve the AD process in a way that will ensure consistent compliance. Those recommendations will be implemented over the next several months by the AD ARC.
• ASAP/FOQA InfoShare: Airlines continue to meet every six months to review the latest safety issues
• identified by ASAP and FOQA programs. The meeting, hosted by FAA and referred to as InfoShare,
• includes all ATA-member airlines and a number of regional airlines. The results of InfoShare are fed into CAST for analysis and further industry-wide action as appropriate.
• Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS): As active participants in the ASIAS effort and its governance body, the ASIAS Executive Board, ATA members recognize the value of aggregating information to create a national view of airline safety. The ASIAS system enables users to perform integrated inquiries across multiple databases, search an extensive warehouse of safety data, and display pertinent elements in an array of useful formats. Additional data sources and capabilities will be available as the system evolves in response both to expanded access to shared data and to technological innovation. ASIAS is critical to establishing the next generation of safety enhancements for CAST, and ATA members continue to invest significant time and resources in its development.
• DOT Inspector Review of Airline Safety: Prompted by requests from both the House and the Senate, the Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated a review of FAA safety oversight of regional air carriers. A centralized database of pilot records would make it easier to evaluate the backgrounds of applicants for flight crew member positions. ATA continues to support an
• FAA review to determine if such a database can be efficiently implemented. To be successful, however, it must be complete. Results of all pertinent actions relating to pilot competency must be recorded and accessible to an airline evaluating an applicant.

FAA

Short Term

• Focused Inspection Initiative: required its principal operations inspectors for part 121 carriers to conduct a focused program review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices.

The first part of the initiative required FAA inspectors to meet with the carriers’ director of operations, director of safety, and company officials responsible for flight crewmember training and qualification programs was to determine the carrier’s ability to identify, track, and manage low-time flight crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events or demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training. Inspectors also looked at whether the carrier adopted the suggestions in Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06015 to voluntarily implement remedial training for pilots with persistent performance deficiencies. The meetings were to occur as soon as possible, but no later than July 15, 2009. I am pleased to report that all of these reviews have been completed.

The second part, set for completion on September 30, of the initiative is currently underway. Inspectors are conducting additional inspections to validate that the carrier’s training and qualification programs meet regulatory standards in accordance with FAA guidance materials, including, among other items:

Review the entire performance history of any pilot in question;

Provide remedial training as necessary; and

Provide additional oversight by the certificate holder to ensure that performance deficiencies are effectively addressed and corrected.

• Flight and Duty Time Rulemaking: FAA made the creation of a new flight and rest rule based on fatigue science a high priority, with an aggressive timeline.

FAA chartered an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC), which began meeting in July 2009. The ARC producing recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management by September 1, 2009, which are now under review.

• Training Program Review Guidance: Using results from initial elements of the focused inspection initiative, FAA will provide guidance material on conducting a comprehensive training program review. This guidance will describe the training program review in the context of a safety management system and its role in a corporate safety culture.

FAA is delaying the develop the guidance, originally scheduled for July 31, for two reasons. First, the inspections will not be completed until September 30. Second, it needed the benefit of the Call to Action safety forum suggestions and ideas.

Analysis of inspecton results and the safety forums will result in the development of a SAFO with the goal of completing the task y December 31.

• Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends Advisory Circular 120-68D, FAA asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants for voluntary disclosure of FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events.
• FOQA and ASAP: Immediate establishment of FOQA and ASAP programs and develop data analysis processes to ensure effective use of this information at carriers that have not already done so. Carriers have overwhelmingly indicated a willingness to make the commitments but not everyone has responded yet. Final findings and recommendations resulting from this effort will be summarized in the final report on the Call to Action that will be published by the end of the calendar year.
• Labor Organizations: Commitments to establish and support professional standards and ethics committees to develop peer audit and review procedures, and to elevate ethics and professional standards. Establish and publish a code of ethics that includes expectations for professional behavior, standards of conduct for professional appearance, and overall fitness to fly.

Intermediate Term between August and December:

• Crew Training Requirements: FAA already had an NPRM open for comment, intended to enhance traditional training programs for crewmembers and dispatchers by requiring the use of flight simulation training devices for flight crewmembers, and including additional training requirements in areas critical to safety. The public comment period closed on August 10 with over 3000 pages of comments. FAA is reviewing these comments and is committed to applying the resources necessary to complete a final rule on an aggressive timeline. The final rule will be consistent with the philosophy of enhancing the quality and effectiveness of training rather than focusing on traditional quantitative measures such as total flight time.
• Guidance to Inspectors on Safety Oversight: Consistent with the report of the Independent Review Team on Managing Risks in Civil Aviation, on which I served, FAA’s Aviation Safety organization included scenario-based training in safety oversight as part of the August All-Managers Conference. This training was intended to address issues raised in the report, including:

Management of varying regulatory interpretation styles within the inspection workforce;

Methods for harmonizing extremes in regulatory application; and,

Methods for optimizing the regulatory effectiveness and coherence across a diverse team of inspectors.

ALPA

• ALPA directed its leadership at 36 airlines to work with their respective airlines to promote and use the document during pilot training. We made the Code available to the FAA at the first CTA and it generated a significant amount of interest.
• FAA has asked ALPA to assist the agency with the development of training materials that can be used by airlines for that purpose. professional standards and pilot training experts have begun work to develop those materials. Initial action was developing the letter to our leadership about its code of conduct.
• It is in the process of creating a new initiative, called the ALPA Professional Development Committee, which will focus on, among other things, education of future airline pilots. The committee leadership is actively working with the University Aviation Association and the Aviation Accreditation Board International on ways in which ALPA can play a more active and useful role in the promotion of the highest standards of professional development by all pilot candidates from university aviation programs.
• ALPA recently published a new white paper on pilot screening, hiring, training and mentoring. This document provides an in-depth examination of the current state of airline pilot screening practices, problems with what we refer to as low-experience pilots, inadequacies in training curricula, the need for greater education requirements for airline pilots than now exists. The paper concludes that airline pilots should be held to a higher standard of competency, knowledge and training than pilots in non-commercial operations, which is not the case at present.
• It reported nearly all of its member airlines have an Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and about half have a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. ALPA is also an active participant in the industry/government Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program. ASIAS involves the sharing and analysis of safety information generated from ASAP and FOQA programs. ALPA has also expended considerable resources over the past several years in assisting the airlines with establishing ASAP and FOQA programs on their properties, and that work continues today.