Exploring a novel approach to container security, and one that may please budget conscious U.S. government officials, the Port of Los Angeles is discussing with terminal operators possible ways to scan more cargo containers at overseas ports before they depart for L.A.
This is aimed at “buying down risk,” John Holmes, the director of operations at the Port of L.A., tells TR2.
For the Port of L.A. the incentive to have more cargo scanned by radiation portal monitors and imaging inspection systems at foreign ports is that it may be too late if something bad is found inside a container as it is being screened at the U.S. port.
“We do 100 percent radiation screening for the cargo that comes into the port,” Holmes says. “As I like to say, that’s great for the cargo and the people of Chicago, but the reality is if there is something bad in the container, we find out about it when it’s right in the middle of the busiest port in the country and a tremendous critical piece of America’s infrastructure.”
Stephen Flynn, a homeland security analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations, tells a House panel recently, once a weapon of mass destruction is found inside a container on port property, more than likely the labor force will walk out and the port will shut down, and no one will be delivering more cargo to that facility.
The Department of Homeland Security is already trying to push out the nation’s borders by having more high-risk U.S.-bound cargo screened by radiation detectors or imaging systems at overseas ports. This is being accomplished through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which has been implemented at 58 foreign ports, and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which is fully operational at three international ports and partially running at several more. The CSI program targets containers deemed to be high risk whereas SFI is aimed at determining the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of cargo for radiological and nuclear materials
However, staffing difficulties, inconsistencies related to working with host governments, how cargo arrives and moves through a port, as well as the time it takes to analyze images of containers taken by X-Ray and gamma ray inspection systems, all serve to limit the amount of cargo that is fully screened.
A very small percentage of cargo arriving from China, Hong Kong and Singapore, which are major trading partners with the Port of L.A., is actually inspected, Holmes says.
So far Holmes has had several meetings in Asia with terminal operators, Hutchison Port Holdings and Modern Terminals, about a possible pilot project to scan more containers at a foreign port as a business-to-business partnership.
While the Port of L.A. has the obvious incentive of business continuity to ensure weapons of mass destruction never come close to its facilities, Holmes says others in the supply chain do as well because they don’t want to see a significant portion of their business shut down due to an event at his port. Still, Holmes says there likely needs to be financial incentives to make this work as a business-to-business arrangement.
When it comes to scanning containers, stakeholders in the trade community want something that works quickly so that throughput isn’t compromised. Containers can pass through radiation portal monitors relatively quickly because the machines are passive and because they either alarm or don’t.
If the radiation detector alarms, and even if it doesn’t–because containers deemed to be high risk are targeted for an imaging or physical inspection–next up there is likely to be an inspection by an imaging system to resolve the alarm.
However, X-Ray and gamma ray imaging systems are active, typically requiring the containers to be parked in a secure area to wait for an inspection system to pass by. While the actual time it takes for an imaging system, such as Science Application International Corp.’s [SAI] VACIS machine, to scan and obtain an image of each container is brief, it can take tens of minutes for an operator to actually analyze the image by comparing it to the cargo manifest. It’s this time consuming analysis, coupled with the need to have the trained manpower to do the job, which makes scanning 100 percent of containers, either overseas or in the U.S., doubtful until the process can be automated.
“That’s sort of the Holy Grail,” Holmes says. “That’s where you have to get to.”
So the issue of financial incentives comes down to who pays for the additional scanning. At some point Holmes believes there will be an unfunded mandate from the federal government to scan all, or at least a higher portion of, containers overseas. How the businesses involved will pick up the tab is unclear as of now, he says.
Holmes says how the funding flows in a possible pilot versus how it ultimately works on a routine basis could be completely different. It’s possible that in a pilot the Port of L.A. pays for the scanning equipment that will be hosted at a foreign terminal. But for routine use, the terminal operator might acquired the necessary equipment and then charge their customers a fee.
“It may be that we give them a break on dockage, or pilotage or rent here in the U.S. for some of these companies,” Holmes says. “It may be that we decide to charge a security fee over here and reimburse them for the cost.”
But, Holmes says, to get terminal operators and even their host governments to willingly look at a larger percentage of containers than they do now there needs to be a financial incentive to do so.
There are still a host of issues that will need to be resolved before a pilot project can get underway. For one, the Port of L.A. still needs to reach an agreement with a terminal operator and a host government on a port. Holmes wants to use a port where it will be a challenge to scan a higher percentage of containers than is currently the case. While it’s easier to scan containers that are trucked in through a gate, Holmes says that in China a lot of cargo is transshipped, meaning it comes into the port either by ship or barge for loading onto a container vessel bound for the Port of L.A.
It’s more difficult to scan transshipped containers, Holmes says. “We’re really trying to find a port that we can test all of these out and do it in a manner that doesn’t really have a significant affect on throughput,” he says.
Holmes says it would likely be easier to use radiation monitors to scan all cargo and then use imaging systems to electronically inspect a certain percentage of containers based in part on targeting protocols that would need to be worked out. X-Ray images could be analyzed by an internationally bonded security company, he says.
The Port of L.A. also wants to look at a report on SFI that Customs and Border Protection recently delivered to Congress, Holmes says.
“We might learn some things from that or we might read it and be totally disappointed and say, ‘this is not a good thing to do,'” Holmes says.
Once all the evaluations are done it will be time to develop a concept of operations, Holmes says. He didn’t cite a specific timeline for moving out on a pilot.