Deferring Or Killing Some Missile Defense Programs Gambles Cities Won’t Be Lost
Some members of Congress are considering cuts in ballistic missile defense programs that amount to a gamble that potential rogue-state enemies will attack with short- or medium-range missiles, rather than long-range weapons — a risk that may turn out to be a tragically losing proposition.
So says retired Army Lt. Gen. Ed Anderson, former commander of the North American Defense Command and now a vice president with Booz Allen Hamilton, a strategy and technology consulting firm. He spoke today in an interview with Space & Missile Defense Report.
One system that might suffer deep cuts in the budget for fiscal 2010 would be the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) now installed in Alaska and California, the only currently operative system designed to protect the nation against long-range enemy ballistic missiles. GMD is led by The Boeing Co. [BA].
Also targeted for cuts are future missile defense programs, such as the Airborne Laser (ABL), being developed by Boeing and others, and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), led by Northrop Grumman Corp. [NOC] and Raytheon Co. [RTN], involving many contractors including Booz Allen.
Anderson said that proponents of deeply cutting some missile defense programs apparently don’t understand how the American missile defense system works.
While the pro-cuts group complains that individual ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems don’t guarantee successful kills of incoming enemy missiles, that ignores the fact that all of the multi-layered BMD systems are intended to work together, not separately.
Thus, the ABL (or perhaps KEI) is designed to hit enemy missiles just after they lift off from the launch pad. The ABL, the only laser system, can continuously fire and keep hitting the missile until it is fried. But if that fails, then other missile defense systems such as the Aegis sea-based system by Lockheed Martin Corp. [LMT] and companion Standard Missile interceptor by Raytheon, or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, also by Lockheed, can use interceptor missiles to strike the enemy weapon and demolish it later in its trajectory.
Anderson noted that it is key –in evaluating the current ability of the United States to defeat enemy missile threats — to consider all of the missile defense systems as overlapping, complementary assets, in a totality.
The multilayered missile defense system is designed to “engage the [threat missile] throughout the flight path,” from launch to terminal descent toward the target city, he said.
With potentially millions of American lives at stake, depending on a successful kill of the enemy missile, “this is tough stuff,” he said. “This is literally rocket science,” in which it is crucial to have multiple opportunities to demolish the enemy weapon in “a holistic total missile defense program.”
One can’t pick and choose, eliminating some programs and keeping others, without lessening probabilities that the entire multilayered system will be able to protect U.S. cities from devastation, he said.
Apparently, he said, proponents of deep cuts in some systems don’t realize that, and don’t realize that eliminating or greatly delaying missile defense programs exposes the United States to risk of nuclear or other missile attacks that could annihilate one or more U.S. cities.
Removing or delaying any single missile defense system, he noted, introduces a risk that “you may not be able to shoot down” an incoming missile, leading to the annihilation of an American city with the loss of countless lives and immense property damage.
If lawmakers wish to roll the dice, and take such a chance, that is their prerogative as decision-makers, he indicated. But they must be conscious, in making that choice, that it is “a risk you are taking.”
When potential adversaries perceive a vulnerability, where the United States cannot protect itself, then the adversaries will invest in assets to exploit that vulnerability, such as developing long-range or intercontinental missiles, he said.
Anderson pointed to North Korea, which shortly may test its Taepo Dong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range that can strike the United States. (Please see coverage in this issue.)
While some analysts have said North Korea, in deciding to launch the ICBM, wished to test President Obama’s mettle and his determination to resist Pyongyang aggression, that may not be entirely correct, Anderson said.
Rather, he observed, it takes so long to prepare for such an ICBM test that the North Korean regime probably made the decision months ago, long before American voters elected Obama president in the November general election.
As well, he observed, Iran just launched a satellite, using a rocket with the same basic technology as an ICBM. (Please see story in Space & Missile Defense Report, Monday, Feb. 9, 2009.)
The Testing Issue
Some lawmakers who will either endorse missile defense cuts if Obama proposes them, or — absent his doing that — propose deep funding cuts in missile defense have justified the move on an argument that some missile defense systems haven’t been well tested.
But that ignores the fact that cutting funds for those missile defense programs may well mean they lack the money to conduct the testing that lawmakers say should be required, Anderson observed.
And, he added, “I’m not sure that you would ever, ever satisfy those who advocate for more testing,” since they seem to desire an airtight guarantee that each missile defense system would work 100 percent of the time, with total assurance it will kill the enemy missile — something that no system can provide, Anderson noted.
Rather than considering any one missile defense system in isolation, he said, one should view the probability that all the systems together, as a multilayered unified entity, will be able to kill the incoming enemy missile, he said.
He also noted that missile defense systems, both individually and as a totality, have a value beyond their capability in killing enemy threats: the American BMD system means potential rogue state adversaries or terrorists have to fear that any missile attack they mount may be defeated. In that case, not only is the target American city saved from ruin, the adversary may be open to a retaliatory attack by U.S. ICBMs, if Washington can determine the origin of the attack.
“The [multilayered BMD system] is intended to be a major deterrent to a major threat,” Anderson said. “It could create a question” in the minds of rogue state leaders, as to whether the enormous effort and expense of developing nuclear weapons and ICBMs is worth it.
Aegis Needs Heads-Up
While some proponents of deep cuts in GMD, ABL or other programs say that in contrast, they like the Aegis system, Anderson said one must view the very capable sea-based system with some perspective.
If there is warning, such as the recent signs that North Korea is about to launch a Taepo Dong-2 or satellite-orbiting rocket, then Aegis-equipped ships can move into position and be poised for a shoot-down attempt. That occurred in the last Taepo Dong-2 test in 2006.
But if there is no warning, and Aegis ships aren’t in the correct position, then one can’t reasonably expect them to execute a shoot-down, he observed. Also, Aegis is just moving into years when perhaps every Aegis ship will have missile defense capabilities, including effectiveness against longer-range enemy threats. (Just 18 of the Arleigh Burke Class (DDG 51) Aegis destroyers and Ticonderoga Class Aegis cruisers have been converted to BMD configuration, out of more than 60 Aegis destroyers and more than 20 cruisers. All of the other Aegis ships could be converted to BMD configuration as well, with a great benefit to the overall U.S. BMD system.)
That is why having many different missile defense systems, including GMD, makes sense, he said.
Ignoring missile defense systems designed to defeat ICBMs and long-range missiles, and focusing only or mainly on missile defense systems that aim to kill short- or medium- range enemy missiles, is short-sighted, amounting to “putting all your eggs in one basket,” Anderson said.
Very deep cuts in the GMD program, for example, “would have an effect on the ability to test the GMD” system, he said.
It is important to have GMD to defeat long-range threats, just as it is important to have systems countering shorter-range threats, in which “certainly Aegis is part of” the overall U.S. missile defense system, he said.
Rep. Trent Franks (R-Ariz.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee strategic forces subcommittee with oversight of missile defense programs, said in a recent Defense Daily Webinar that he expects missile defense opponents to propose cuts totaling $3 billion out of the total $9.6 billion yearly spent on missile defense, with some programs being slashed 50 percent or more.
If that eventuates, Anderson warned, “it will be difficult for [the Missile Defense Agency] to put together a viable program” to protect the United States and its citizens from ballistic missile attacks.
Such “draconian” slashing of BMD budgets, he said, would present “huge fiscal challenges” to the agency and its leaders as they attempt to develop protections against a devastating attack, Anderson said.