Equipping airliners with defensive systems against terrorist surface-to-air missile attacks may be the one of the least efficient ways to spend aviation security dollars, according to a RAND Corp. study. A potentially more life-saving approach would be to speed up passenger processing to shorten lines of people highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks from bombs or gunfire.
The study assayed a wide range of potential threats to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), focusing on 11 scenarios that were the most likely, based on previous terrorist attacks on LAX and other airports. One of the scenarios for LAX included missiles fired from offshore or the nearby beach against a B777 on takeoff. Such an attack by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) would have only about a 10 percent chance of destroying the airplane, the RAND analysis asserted. In fact, such an attack was classified among the lesser threats to LAX. “Ten percent seemed realistic, based on past MANPADS attacks and the robustness of an airplane,” said Thomas Hamilton, one of the co-authors of the RAND report.
The RAND analysis, released Sept. 24 and titled “Near-Term Options for Improving Security at Los Angeles International Airport,” concluded that bombs detonated in airplanes while in flight or detonated at the airport have the potential to kill the greatest number of people. Travelers bunched into lines waiting to check in at curbside, or inside the terminal, present a particularly vulnerable target to bombs concealed in baggage. Hamilton described the problem as “protecting against a Madrid-type scenario.” He was referring to the train bombings in Madrid earlier this year. Any time large numbers of people are in a confined space, be it a rail car or an airport terminal, and unscreened bags are present, the vulnerability to concealed-bombs can be pronounced.
Based on observing the terminals on several weekday mornings this past summer, the RAND report said:
“We note that the check-in area and the sidewalk outside are often quite crowded, with 300-400 people crowded into a small area. The striking thing about this crowd is that at any given time, most of these people are not doing anything except waiting in line. There are about 35 airport personnel who are checking and screening passengers’ bags, and about 25 passengers are being processed at any given time.
“We also note that many of the passengers waiting in the terminal have with them large pieces of luggage, none of which has yet been screened.
“Recall that this concept, using bombs to attack people standing in line, is precisely what Ahmed Ressam (the millennium bomber) testified that he intended to implement.
“We note that this type of attack could either be executed by a suicide bomber or by detonating the bomb without causing the death of the attacker. Simply walking away from a piece of luggage may not be generally noticed in the generally confused conditions inside the terminal.”
Thus, the RAND analysts believed that with a 5 percent increase in the number of check-in and screening personnel, the number of fatalities from a luggage bomb would be reduced by 80 percent – mainly by expediting the passenger processing and reducing the length of the lines. The initial and recurrent costs would be in the range of $5 million.
The RAND analysts used standard mathematical queuing models. They found that increasing the staffing level by one ticket counter station (from 19 to 20) would reduce the average line length from 75 to 15. Adding one skycap (from three to four) would reduce the average line length from 70 to 3. Not only would the temptation of terrorists to attack long lines of passengers be reduced greatly, the travel experience of the passengers would be improved.
The RAND report said:
“The amount of actual work required to check bags, etc., remains the same whether people have waited or not. Substantial reduction of lines can be implemented immediately with small changes to airline and TSA [Transportation Security Administration] staffing policies. This is our strongest recommendation.”
Hamilton said, “They don’t need more people at the airport, just at different times.”
“The peaks are very predictable,” he said. Hamilton observed that fast-food restaurants shift their staffing to handle the lunch-hour crush, to minimize customer waiting time. “Airports are one of the very few places where people are expected to stand in line,” he said.
By way of comparison to the low cost of adding staff, it would cost an estimated $8 million annually to patrol areas where MANPADS could be launched against airplanes. “Unfortunately, this is an enormous area, and so patrols have very little chance of intercepting an attacker,” the RAND report said.
To install a high-power ground based laser to shoot down MANPADS could cost $30 million to $100 million. Although the ground-based laser has been rejected by the TSA, the total cost of equipping airplanes on the ground at LAX at any one time with missile defenses would be in this range.
Many of the terrorist scenarios assessed by the RAND analysts involve weaknesses in airport perimeter security, shortcomings in cargo security, inadequate employee security (e.g., access to “secure” parts of the airport), and the vulnerability of an airport to bombs concealed in vehicles. Recall that in its recent security report card, the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA) ranked perimeter security a “D” and cargo and employee screening an “F” (see ASW, Sept. 20).
CAPA also gave an “F” to missile defenses for airplanes, but the RAND study suggests that other measures could be implemented at less cost to blunt or discourage deadlier terrorist scenarios. For example, RAND said that about 75 percent of the cargo carried on passenger planes could be screened using luggage-screening machines, leaving only the remaining 25 percent to be screened manually. CAPA believes that unscreened cargo loaded aboard airliners presents a wide-open target of opportunity to terrorists.
RAND also recommended adding vehicle security checkpoints as a low-cost enhancement to security that could be done quickly. As a longer-term measure, these checkpoints could be fitted with scales embedded in the roadway. The scales could quickly weigh all vehicles entering the airport, and those with suspiciously high weights might be trucks or cars laden with bombs – thus triggering more detailed inspections while allowing other vehicles to pass. This option accords closely with the three-tier vehicle security checkpoint system recommended by aviation security expert Billie Vincent (see ASW, Sept. 20).
RAND estimated that adding permanent vehicle checkpoints with bomb detection capabilities at five different locations would cost about $12 million annually.
Brian Sullivan, a retired Federal Aviation Administration special agent who is intimately familiar with the vulnerabilities prevailing on 9/11 at Boston’s Logan airport, said, “You can’t protect everything at the same time with limited resources, but you can take action to address what you see as the most likely threats and address those soonest with what you have available for funding and resources. The RAND study makes that point quite well.” (For Sullivan’s reaction to the 9/11 Commission report, see ASW, Aug. 16).
Sullivan added, “In the LAX scenario, crowded terminals are obviously a valid concern, particularly if one has witnessed the evacuation procedures in previous incidents of security breaches there. I’d be surprised if that hasn’t been factored into terrorist planning already.” (The full RAND report may be viewed at http://www.Rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2004/RAND_DB468-1.pdf) >> Sullivan, e-mail [email protected]; Hamilton, e-mail [email protected] <<
Bombs 101
It’s not the size of the bomb – it’s where it’s detonated:
A luggage bomb inside a crowded terminal would kill more people than a much larger car bomb curbside.
A relatively small bomb in the cargo compartment of an airliner would have greater consequences than a 5,000-lb. truck bomb anywhere on the airport public grounds.
Since 1974, LAX has been the site of two bombings (the international terminal in August 1974 and the China Air baggage processing area in January 1980), and two attempted bombings (the Air Canada terminal in May 1982 and the Millennium bombing plot in December 1999).
Source: RAND
The Threat to Airports
- Of 5,347 deaths that have resulted from terrorist attacks on civil aviation since 1980, only 195 have occurred in attacks on airports themselves, as opposed to aircraft.
- LAX is one of the safest places in Los Angeles. It was one of the first airports to implement baggage screening procedures, an on-site bomb squad, high police presence, a distributed terminal layout, and large numbers of bomb-sniffing dogs. Despite this high level of security, there are good reasons to believe that LAX is viewed by at least some terrorists as a particularly attractive target. Since 1974, LAX has been the site of two bombings, two attempted bombings, and one gun attack.
Source: RAND
| Terrorist Attack Scenarios As presented by the RAND analysis | |
|---|---|
| Method of Attack | Description |
| Large truck bomb (The Oklahoma City bombing scenario) | A large bomb could be concealed in a truck. If the bomb were detonated at the lower level next to a column supporting the upper roadway, we expect a large number of deaths, using observed passenger concentrations. This includes deaths from the curbside and baggage claim areas and at the departure level. The front portion of the terminal would be lost, along with two sections of elevated roadway. The airport would be closed for an extended period of time. Even simple vehicle scales can identify suspicious vehicles, which can then be diverted before entering the airport proper. |
| Curbside car bomb | A medium-sized bomb detonated in the right lane in front of the travelers in line for a skycap might cause a large number of deaths. The number of deaths is very sensitive to the density and number of people standing in line. Diverting all vehicles to remote lots and busing passengers to terminals would reduce vulnerability to vehicle bombs, but it would cost a great deal more than reducing the size of vulnerable lines. |
| Luggage bomb | A small bomb detonated in a large screening line could also produce a large number of deaths, depending on the density and number of people in line. |
| Uninspected cargo bomb | A bomb that is placed inside uninspected cargo and detonated in a passenger aircraft during flight could kill hundreds of passengers. |
| Insider-planted cargo bomb | With the assistance of an employee with access to the airport, a bomb placed inside a large passenger aircraft could blow it up in flight, killing hundreds of passengers. |
| Ground attack of air operations | In this scenario, a well-armed group of terrorists scales the perimeter fence and attacks the fuel area, runways and passenger aircraft. This is similar to an attack by the Tamil Tigers that occurred in 2001 at Sri Lanka. A double fence with motion detection capability would improve LAX’s response capability to intruders attacking the air operations area. |
| Public grounds attack | A terrorist bolts through security controls, forcing evacuation of a terminal. This action is coordinated with well-armed terrorists coming from vehicles blocking the entrances and exits to the airport, with the goal of killing as many civilians as possible. Current airport police equipment would be of limited effectiveness against well-equipped attackers. However, we believe that such an armed incursion is, from the terrorists’ point of view, a poor strategy. It will probably kill fewer people than a well-placed bomb, and it will be difficult for the terrorists to get away. |
| Control tower/utility plant bomb | A car or truck bombing occurs with enough explosives to destroy the air traffic control tower or utility plant. |
| Man portable air defense system (MANPADS) missile attack | We assume that a properly aimed and launched MANPADS attack will result in destruction of an airliner less than 10 percent of the time. We examined the scenario where two surface-to-air missiles are launched from a boat in the bay adjacent to LAX, from the beach, or from sand dunes, at a B777 taking off. |
| Sniper attack | A sniper sets up on the roof of a high-rise building adjacent to the airport with a .50-caliber sniper rifle and shoots at loaded planes, firing approximately 50 shots over five minutes (see ASW, Nov. 3, 2003). |
| Mortar attack | An attack similar to the Irish Republican Army attack on London’s Heathrow Airport, in which two homemade mortars are fitted into the back of a van and terrorists fire mortar shells along the length of the runway. The attack might disrupt operations for several days, but it would kill few people on average. However, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that a mortar round could hit a loaded plane. For the mortar attack, two homemade mortars are fitted into the back of a van. |
| Source: RAND | |