By Calvin Biesecker
A small vessel attack on a piece of critical infrastructure or a larger vessel that block the channel into Port of New York and New Jersey is the “greatest single threat” to continuing operations at the port, the chief of security at the port said on Friday.
The port has a single chokepoint that all deep draft vessels must pass through that if “compromised by a small vessel attack…it will essentially shut down the entire Port of New York and New Jersey,” Bethann Rooney, manager for port security at the Port of NY/NJ, said at a port security roundtable sponsored by The Center for National Policy.
She said it’s time to move beyond paper strategies, which already exist for the small vessel threat, and implement them.
Rooney also said that risk assessments for ports need to go deeper into how ports function rather than focus strictly on the port writ large, as is now the case.
“You don’t need to lose an entire facility in order to have a catastrophic impact,” she said. “But, unfortunately, our risk assessments are based on attacking an entire facility as opposed to just a piece of infrastructure within that facility.”
Rooney’s comments were echoed by Cosmo Perrone, the director of security at the Port of Long Beach in California.
There is certain critical infrastructure within the port that if it shuts down, it could shut down the entire port, Perrone said.
“The way we approach the concept of continuity [of operations] is to address every critical process,” Perrone said. “Sewer systems, utility lines, food delivery systems; knock one of those out you knock out the port.” For example, if the sanitary systems at the port were to stop working, the longshoremen would walk out, he said.
On the matter of cargo security screening, Rooney said “existing programs don’t go far enough.” For example, she said that Customs and Border Protection is so focused on screening containers yet there are types of cargo entering her port such as automobiles that don’t get scanned at all by X-ray inspection systems for concealed threats. The same with bulk cargos such as fertilizer, she said.
While not specifically mentioning Customs and Border Protection’s Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which is a voluntary best security practices program that shippers and manufacturers can enter into in return for certain trade benefits, Rooney said “We are particularly concerned about a system that is built on trust with minimal verification of those trustworthy relationships.” While CBP audits the C-TPAT participants, she told Defense Daily the audits don’t cover everyone within that member’s supply chain.
Regarding the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), a congressional mandate that would have all cargo bound for the United States scanned by X-ray systems and radiation portal monitors at the foreign port of departure, Perrone said the international port operators have warned him that if this happens he should expect to have to electronically scan all cargo leaving the Port of Long Beach for their ports.
That “would shut us down,” Perrone said.
However, Rooney said it would be best to move as much scanning of inbound cargo overseas as possible to mitigate any threat to her port. As to the issue of reciprocity and foreign port operators requiring the Port of NY/NJ to scan all cargo headed overseas, she told Defense Daily. “We would deal with it.”
At the Port of NY/NJ, scanning takes place at exit lanes as cargo is leaving the port facility. But the average dwell time for cargo at the port is five to seven days, so containers and other cargo are sitting in holding areas before departing. If there is something dangerous such as a bomb inside a container, then terrorists could just press a button to set off an explosion in the port, Rooney said.
For now, implementation of the SFI mandate seems untenable and Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano has already said that the 2012 deadline won’t be met.
Whether all U.S. bound cargo does get scanned overseas, Rooney said the security model needs to change at U.S. ports. Rather than have radiation and X-ray scans occur as containers are leaving the terminal, she would prefer that these technologies be integrated into operations sooner, such as having radiation detectors on the spreader bars of cranes for scanning containers as they are lifted from a ship. This would lead to uncovering potential threats sooner, she said.
Still, both Perrone and Rooney pointed to the issue of what happens when something bad is found inside a container.
No one wants to be the guy that has to move that container then, Perrone said.