There still isn’t technology available that will automatically detect potential threats inside of shipping containers, and without such a capability manual operators are still needed to identify potential threats, a process that takes time and would slow the pace of commerce if implemented at ports that ship cargo directly to the United States, a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) official told House members on Thursday.
The “biggest” challenge in the four-year long Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) that was piloted at six foreign ports was the X-ray imaging of all the U.S.-bound cargo due to the human in the loop, Todd Owen, executive assistant commissioner for the Office of Field Operations at CBP, told a joint hearing of the House Transportation and Infrastructure’s Coast Guard Subcommittee and the House Homeland Security Border and Maritime Subcommittee. “That will slow down cargo.”
Congress under the SAFE Port Act in 2006 mandated that the Department of Homeland Security implement a 100 percent radiation and imaging scanning solution for all U.S.-bound cargo from overseas ports. However, both the former Bush and current Obama administrations have said that implementing the 100 percent mandate is too costly and would significantly impact the flow of global trade.
Owen also pointed out that most of the largest container ports worldwide are transshipment ports where cargo doesn’t come in by truck to a terminal but rather is ship to ship, barge to ship, or rail to ship, “which presents a whole other challenge in terms of the flow of cargo.”
The SFI, which began in the 2006 and 2007 period, is still operating at Port Qasim in Pakistan, where in 2015 68,000 containers were scanned for radiation and imaged to verify contents, Owen said. That data was sent to CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC), where an agency officer decides whether a container can be loaded on a vessel destined for the U.S., he said.
CBP has now expanded the SFI to include the Port of Aqaba in Jordan, where the agency is now scanning 100 percent of all U.S. bound cargo containers, Owen said. CBP vetted trained, foreign service nationals to man the scanning operations, he said.
“In July 2016, the Port of Aqaba will be fully functional and able to transmit scan data in real-time to the NTC,” Owen said in his written remarks for the hearing. He added that 100 percent scanning at Aqaba is made feasible by the “low to medium” volume of cargo headed to the U.S., “and the small percentage of transshipped cargo, which allowed scanning equipment to be placed at the entrance to the port so as not to hinder the flow of cargo movement.”
Some cargo that is deemed high-risk by the NTC before it leaves foreign ports is imaged for potential threats. Owen said this amounts to 1.1 percent of all U.S. bound maritime containers. Another 2.6 percent is imaged once it arrives in the U.S., he said.
All maritime shipping containers arriving at U.S. seaports are scanned by Radiation Portal Monitors for potential radiological threats.
Even though Congress has directed that all U.S. bound shipping containers be imaged before departure from foreign ports, DHS through a series of exemptions has been able to delay implementation.
Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee, said that while the U.S. currently has a handle on the smuggling of illicit radiological and nuclear materials, this “is coming to an end.” He said there is a “five- to 10-year window and then we need to have” the 100 percent scanning solution in place overseas “because it only takes once” for a weapon of mass destruction in the U.S.
The Congressional Budget Office last month in a report estimated the costs to implement 100 percent overseas container scanning at between $12 billion and $32 billion over 10 years. The estimates exclude potential reciprocity laws by foreign governments requiring cargo departing the U.S. to be scanned using imaging and radiation detection systems.
Anne Harrington, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, told the panel terrorist groups would like to get their hands on radiological and nuclear materials and the expertise to turn them into weapons. She also said some material may already be beyond regulatory control, pointing to interdictions in countries like Georgia and Moldova.
Harrington also said that while there is still minimal contact with Russian authorities, that country’s “decision to halt most of our nuclear security cooperation leads to a concern that security controls on material in Russia are weakening.”