Hundreds of aircraft could be retrofitted in 28 months from ‘go’ order
The missile threat to commercial airliners burst into public view last week, with the arrest of three illegal arms dealers bent on acquiring the lethal SA-18 portable missile receiving the full media “treatment.”
What best to do about the risk from an operational and hardware standpoint is another matter. Spiraling descents and take-offs to minimize exposure to surface-to-air missiles would dramatically reduce airport capacity, not to mention the increase in passengers’ use of airsick bags. Installing defensive hardware to airliners involves added weight, another demand on aircraft electrical power, and an additional item to maintain.
These considerations may pale in the face of the penalty for doing nothing. There is no question that a successful missile attack on a U.S. airliner would shut down the industry, and keep it grounded until aircraft were retrofitted with defensive systems. Not only would passengers refuse to fly, so would pilots – especially if they were to embrace a concept outlined recently in Canada. Under the Canada Labor Code, employees have a right to refuse dangerous work and, as indicated in a Transport Canada safety letter, that coverage includes pilots.
Capt. Paul Onorato of the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA) described portable missiles as “an immediate threat to commercial aircraft worldwide.” He reiterated CAPA’s support for legislation introduced earlier this year by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D – Calif.) that would mandate installation of defense systems on all airliners (see ASW, March 3).
Calls in Congress for such a retrofit are mirrored overseas. Arch Bevis, member of Australia’s Parliament, declared, “It seems to me a major flaw in Australia’s approach to these things that we are not requiring at least Qantas aircraft going to high risk locations to have appropriate countermeasures installed.”
“This is a threat that exists today,” Bevis added. “For us not to be taking action, as a parliament or for the government not to be taking action or indeed Qantas itself not to be taking action, I think is negligence.”
Evil undone
Bevis’ remarks followed the Aug. 12 arrest of three men, one in Newark and two in New York City, bent on obtaining missiles to employ against U.S. airliners. The timely arrests illustrate that the most effective means of blunting the threat begins long before terrorist “triggermen” can get into firing position in the environs of an airport. Just as the hardened cockpit door is the last line of a layered system of security against hijacking, a proactive defense would extend all the way to counter-offensive operations in the terrorists’ presumed “safe” havens. A tiered defense against man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) involves first reaching out and intercepting the threat before it gets close to an airliner.
This paramount imperative was amply demonstrated in the coordinated U.S.-British-Russian “sting” operation that left the plotters with nothing but a harmless decoy missile for their money. This success in the shadowy war against terrorism notwithstanding, the threat persists – and because of the publicity, may be worsening. The unsuccessful attack on a departing Israeli B757 charter jet Nov. 28, 2002, in Mombasa, Kenya, involved the launch of two SA-7 heat-seeking missiles. Industry sources speculate the missiles may have been launched prematurely by anxious gunners, and perhaps too close to the airliner to stabilize and lock onto the target (the potential role of defensive avionics on Israeli airliners, often rumored, has not entered public discussions of the incident). The missiles used also may have been training models (i.e., with built-in safety limitations).
The lethal needle
The subject of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other government agencies’ sting operation was the illegal sale of the SA-18 “Igla” missile (Igla is Russian for “Needle,” the symbol of which is emblazoned on the weapon), an advanced successor to the SA-7. As one industry source said, it is quite possible that “everyone who shouldn’t have it, now does have it.”
The Russians have sold the SA-18 to North Korea, Vietnam and Iran. Last year, the Israelis attempted to block the sale of SA-18s to Syria. Some reports suggest that Palestinian cells have been trained in Iraq to employ the SA-18. Although at least seven fatal attacks against commercial airlines have occurred from 1996 to 2000, killing more than 300, the SA-18 has not yet been used in this deadly role.
With a time of flight of 7-15 seconds (depending upon firing position and relative direction of the target aircraft’s flight), the SA-18 has a slant range of about three miles and a maximum altitude of more than 11,000 feet. Its infrared (IR) guidance system is claimed to offer better protection against electro-optical jammers. According to defense industry literature, the SA-18 has a single-shot kill probability against unprotected military fighters of 30-48 percent, and that the use of infrared countermeasures (IRCMs) only degrade the missile’s effectiveness some 20 percent, to a single-shot kill probability of 24-30 percent.
However, so-called directed IRCM countermeasures (DIRCM) may be more effective. “We are all about directed IRCM’s,” declared Jack Pledger, director of IRCM business development at Northrop Grumman [NYSE: NOC]. He and other Northrop Grumman officials have proposed retrofitting onto commercial aircraft a variant of the company’s Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM). This defensive system is used to protect many large military jets, such as the C-17, the KC-10 and B737, the latter two of which are very similar to their commercial cousins.
Foiling the attack
In contrast to flares or strobe lights, Pledger said, “Our LAIRCM allows us to direct much higher energy on the missile seeker.”
The defensive system would be mounted in an upside-down “canoe” shaped pod on the belly of the airplane. Four fixed sensors, each with a 120� field of view, are arrayed in the pod to cover forward, aft, left and right. The overlapping coverage of these “staring sensors” would provide full 360 coverage.
Operating in the ultraviolet range (UV), the sensors are designed to detect the distinct spectral “signature” of a missile launch. Working in the UV bandwidth allows for better discrimination of a missile launch from background clutter.
Alerted by the staring sensors, a rotating scanner working in the IR bandwidth (to further discriminate a missile threat from clutter) tracks the inbound missile. It quickly transmits a narrow laser beam of IR energy in a modulated, classified waveform. This energy disrupts the missile’s tracking system, causing it to break IR lock and veer off course and away from the airplane.
If the airplane is attacked at close range (e.g., Mombasa scenario), as little as three seconds will elapse from missile detection to its divert. At longer ranges, total LAIRCM engagement time would be on the order of 6-7 seconds.
The combination of UV and IR detection and tracking has much to do with the system’s effectiveness, Pledger proclaimed.
How well does it work? Pledger said LAIRCM is designed to defeat all missiles on the U.S. military’s threat list. He stressed the word “all.”
The system has undergone successful operational tests. “The military requirement was to defeat multiple threats in the air, which we have demonstrated in live firing tests,” Pledger added.
Deploying defenses
Pledger said the concept envisioned by Northrop Grumman would involve installing LAIRCM on four airliners, representing a mix of narrowbody and widebody airplanes, for purposes of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight tests. “We can be ready for FAA-authorized flight tests in nine months from the decision date,” Pledger said. He estimated that FAA certification could be obtained within three months.
This timeline suggests that a defensive system for airliners could be tested and certified for deployment in 12 months.
Northrop Grumman officials envision partial deployment, initially to 300 airplanes in the U.S. fleet. This population includes those large jets flying to destinations “outside U.S. borders,” Pledger said. Most of these aircraft also are in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF aircraft often fly to the same locations as military aircraft already protected by LAIRCM systems. Thus, the first-stage retrofit to these 300 airliners would provide near-term protection for international flights and for mobilization aircraft.
From contract award to completion of the 300th aircraft, the work could be done in 28 months, Pledger estimated. That schedule implies an average retrofit rate of slightly more than 10 airplanes per month. The work would be done during C or D checks. Cost would average $2 million per plane, not including design and FAA-certification costs. The commercial version of LAIRCM would be common among all aircraft. It can operate on 28 volt DC or 115 volt AC aircraft power, further simplifying fleetwide installation. “It’s the leisure suit approach, one size fits all,” Pledger quipped. A specific adapter plate is all that would be required for each model of airplane, he explained.
In March 20 testimony before the House Aviation Subcommittee about the missile threat, Dr. Robert DelBoca, Northrop Grumman’s vice president for infrared countermeasures systems, said the military’s LAIRCM system is “proven, effective, affordable means of providing [missile] protection to America’s airline industry and our flying public.”
More to the point, he added, “It is available now.”
Even so, the retrofit program envisioned by Northrop Grumman may not be aggressive enough. Retrofitting 300 airplanes over a period in excess of two years (28 months to test, certify and retrofit) covers less than 10 percent of the U.S. fleet. This schedule implies that it could take nearly a decade to retrofit the entire U.S. fleet. Expanding the retrofit program to cover a larger fraction of the more than 4,000 jetliners estimated to be in U.S. service would drop the installation cost to $1 million. Northrop Grumman officials estimate the entire fleet could be equipped in a six-year period at a total cost of around $3 billion (which places the average cost below $1 million per airplane).
In the meantime, the loss of a single jetliner – from a regional jet to a widebody – on any flight in the U.S., not just overseas, from a portable missile would be intolerable. >> Pledger, e-mail [email protected]; Onorato, tel. 202/756-2956 <<
A Concept Pilots Might Embrace
In the event of a successful missile attack on an airliner
From Transport Canada, Aviation Safety Letter 3/2002 (extracts):
“The Canada Labour Code … provides employees with three basic rights:
- The right to know;
- The right to participate; and
- The right to refuse dangerous work.
For pilots, refusals to work in dangerous, or potentially dangerous, situations could occur under a variety of scenarios, including:
- Security issues on board aircraft;
- Concerns about improperly packaged, loaded or secured cargo;
- Pressures to complete flight on schedule; or
- Deteriorating weather conditions.
While not meant to be an exhaustive list, the above are possible situations that could result in a pilot having reasonable cause to believe that taking-off or continuing flight constitutes a danger, or a potential danger, to themselves or others. Should a pilot believe an operation is dangerous, for whatever reason, he or she would be acting within his or her legal right to refuse to work.”