The Aircraft’s Manufacturer Weighs In With A Rebuttal To Our Coverage

Our highly critical analysis of the safety record of the MU-2 (“A Good Grounding in Grounding”, Sept. 18 ASW) received a spirited rebuttal from the manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHIA).

In the interest of journalistic fairness and integrity, we include MHIA’s arguments in this issue. As you will see, MHIA doesn’t pull any punches in defending its product.

The MU-2 is a widely prevalent aircraft. During the MU-2’s 20-year production run, MHIA delivered 703 copies of the aircraft, although http://www.airliners.net claims authoritatively that more than 800 of all models were built. At last count there were 309 MU-2s left in the United States, 23 in Europe, 32 in South America, 13 in Canada, four in Australia and a few in other parts of the world.

Wikipedia cites a 2005 U.S. population of 397 MU-2s. More current information states that worldwide, the MU-2 fleet totals 394, not including another 40 MU-2s operated by the Japanese Defense Agency for patrol and search-and-rescue missions.

The MHIA rep who authored the article in response below hasn’t commented upon the type’s attrition rate, so we won’t either. The MU-2 remains a popular owner-flown and corporate turboprop. Mitsubishi’s continued strong support of an airplane that has been out of production for 20 years is laudable.

There are six authorized service centers located in the U.S. The free MU-2 Pilots Review of Proficiency (Prop) seminars run by MHIA are open to anyone interested in operating, or already flying, an MU-2. The seminars also cover the biennial icing-awareness training required by airworthiness directive 2003-22-07.

A 2005 FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) concluded that with reasonable training, an average pilot could operate the MU-2 safely if operated within AFM guidelines. The FAA and MHIA have been developing a training program and standardized checklists that will soon be compulsory for all MU-2 operators.

The training program will be mandated through an expected early 2007 published special FAR (SFAR) and via the FSB report. For Part 91 pilots, training will be mandated via the SFAR. In addition to SFAR compliance, for Part 135 MU-2 pilots the FSB report will be the guiding document for mandatory training.

Most current MU-2 pilots will enter the required training syllabus at the less exhaustive re-qualification stage. Recurrent training is thereafter required every 12 calendar months. MU-2 flight instructors also must meet new standards, needing at least 2,000 hours overall, 800 hours multi-engine, 300 in command MU-2 and 50 hours of MU-2 within the last 12 months.

Greg Feith, a former NTSB investigator and aircraft safety consultant who was tasked with researching the MU-2 accident history, examined 214 MU-2 accidents and incidents since 1968.

Feith concluded that many of the accidents were more unique and “one off” than the limited NTSB Reports were able to determine. He found that many accidents were traceable to lack of type training and poor airmanship.

MHIA’s response below presents “the other side of the story”. We will certainly revisit this controversy, in future issues.

ASW stated:

[U.S. Rep.] Tancredo’s trigger was two loss-of-control crashes within the same week (N6569L on Sept. 1 and N171MA on Aug. 25), on top of the FAA’s continuing reluctance to do anything tangible about the type’s abysmal fatal accident record. The two crashes were apparently heavy weather related, typical of the MU-2 fatal accident genre and easy enough to just blame on the weather and pilot judgment.

MHIA’s response:

In both of the recent MU-2 accidents, it is undisputed that the aircraft flew into known thunderstorm activity as determined by the NTSB and the FAA. When radar tracks clearly show that both aircraft flew into such conditions, why would any aviation expert question the cause? Did ASW question the FAA and NTSB when the renowned flight test pilot Scott Crossfield did a similar act in his Cessna with similar disastrous results?

We don’t see ASW questioning the other 116 in-flight weather related breakups reported by the NTSB over the past 10 years. Why doesn’t ASW question the NTSB and FAA findings regarding the recent Twin Commander accident where the pilot flew into a thunderstorm resulting in an in-flight breakup that was fatal to four?

ASW stated:

Tancredo seems to have a genuine gripe against the high performance Mitsubishi twin turboprop, as well as being well versed in his subject. Together with four other congressmen and a senator, he has been waging a war against the deadly record of the airplane for some years and has been successful, insofar as making the FAA carry-out a recent in-depth Airplane Safety Evaluation of the MU-2.

MHIA’s response:

The accidents that motivated Rep. Tancredo involved MU-2s operated by a company flying out of Centennial Airport in Denver, Colorado. The NTSB determined that neither of these accidents were the fault of the airplane.

Interestingly enough, a Cessna 421 had an ACTUAL engine failure at the same airport only seven days after the first MU-2 accident, killing three, and a Cessna 425 also crashed killing four, while flying the same ILS approach 700 feet low, just 9 days after the second MU-2 accident.

Rep. Tancredo failed to mention the Cessna accidents that were eerily similar to the MU-2 accidents that caused him to become so vocal. It is interesting to note that the source of Tancredo’s information appears to be a plaintiff’s lawyer and his professional witness, while neither Tancredo nor his staff ever contacted Mitsubishi or any typical MU- 2 owner/operators to ascertain the facts.

MHIA suggests ASW take more time to delve into the motive(s) of their sources before publishing such material in the newsletter.

ASW stated:

A much earlier Special Certification Review (SCR) in 1997, and another in 1983, had already examined the safe operation of the MU-2 and concluded that pilots operating the demanding airplane required a very high level of skill and currency, regular flight reviews and a comprehensive initial training program. MHIA’s response:

Neither the 1983 SCR nor the 1997 FFFSCR made the statements attributed to them in this paragraph. What is FACTUAL is that the SCR, the FFFSCR and the recent MU-2 Safety Evaluation state that the MU-2 meets all certification requirements and that MHIA has been recommending comprehensive training and regular flight reviews since the inception of the MU-2 program over 30 years ago.

ASW stated:

Of course, the MU-2 has its advocates as well as its critics. However, between the two camps there are an increasing number of pragmatists who want to get across a constructive message of universal application.

One suggestion: a basic requirement for any aircraft to be certified is that its flying characteristics allow it to be safely flown by an average pilot. For an aircraft to be safe, there must be forgiving latitude in both its handling and condition. MU-2 handling is an area where the scope for error is extremely limited, particularly in non-normal operation. That’s not “safe”, in any rational definition of the word. MHIA’s response:

The FAA again and again has verified that the MU-2 meets all certification requirements. That an aircraft can be flown safely by an average pilot IS already part of the Type Certification requirements that the MU-2 has successfully passed four times from original certification to the present.

The MU-2 is a safe airplane when flown per the Airplane Flight Manual by properly trained pilots. What has been missing has been the mandatory training that the FAA is in the process of implementing.

MHIA concludes with the following offer to this publication’s readers:

ASW‘s editorializing on the handling capabilities of the MU-2 are NOT shared by those who fly and operate the aircraft on a daily basis or the certifying agencies.

MHIA extends an offer to the pilots among ASW‘s readership to fly the MU-2 and access its operational characteristics for themselves, rather than rely so heavily on the comments from plaintiff’s attorneys and their expert witnesses who have never flown the MU-2.

MHIA is confident that any pilot who flies the MU-2 and approaches that flight with an open mind will find that the aircraft is well designed both structurally and aerodynamically.

When operated to the Airplane Flight Manual by a trained pilot, the MU-2, like any complex twin, is a safe airplane.