Based on results so far in operational testing, the new head of the Transportation Security Agency’s (TSA) office that oversees security technology development and acquisition said this week that competing systems developed to detect fraudulent IDs and boarding passes are not ready for procurement.
The agency at three airports is pilot testing Credential Authentication Technology/Boarding Pass Scanning Systems (CAT/BPSS) systems developed by three companies, BAE Systems, Safran’s MorphoTrust and NCR Corp.’s [NCR] Government Systems division under contracts awarded last fall (TR2, Oct. 12, 2011).
Testifying before the House Homeland Security Transportation Security Subcommittee, Kelly Hoggan, assistant administrator for TSA’s Office of Security Capabilities, said the systems have issues with matching and presenting names and issues related to IDs. The agency doesn’t plan to buy the systems until next year based on the test results, he said.
In his prepared remarks Hoggan says that the CAT/BPSS pilots are concluding at the three airports. Prior to OT&E, the systems went through a series of qualification tests and lab tests.
To help Transportation Security Officers (TSO) contend with the over 2,400 variations of valid identity documents that can be used for air travel, the CAT/BPSS systems are designed to verify and validate passengers’ travel and identity credentials when they arrive at an airport security checkpoint. The systems will also automatically identify passengers that have been selected for “differentiated screening” under the Risk-Based Screening program that TSA is implementing at airport checkpoints, Hoggan says.
If the systems eventually work as intended, they would replace the manual method of ID and boarding pass authentication TSO’s currently perform.
At the outset of the hearing Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), highlighted three problems with the CAT/BPSS systems. One is that the systems are not integrated with other layers of security, such as the terrorist watch list.
Hoggan agreed with Rogers, saying that the systems are only meant for validating and verifying credentials and boarding passes. Hoggan pointed out that passengers are screened against no fly lists through the Secure Flight process prior to receiving a boarding pass.
Rogers also said that program costs have jumped dramatically, with acquisition costs going from $35 million to $115 million and estimated life-cycle costs going from $83 million to $150 million. He also said that the expected per unit costs of CAT/BPSS systems have gone from $25,000 to $100,000.
Hoggan says the $100,000 per unit cost figure is incorrect but said he couldn’t publicly disclose the unit cost estimate.
As for the acquisition and life-cycle cost estimates, Hoggan says for 1,400 units, which has been the planned buy, the cost is between $35 million and $45 million. He says on top of that is a $130 million life-cycle cost over 20 years, which includes replacement purchases of 2,600 units beginning seven to eight years after the original purchases.
The life-cycle cost estimate is “reasonably comprehensive and well documented,” Stephen Lord, director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability Office, says in his prepared remarks at the hearing. However, he says an assumption of 1 percent annual inflation included in the estimate is well below the 3.3 to 4.5 percent historic range for FY ’09-’14.
Lord also says that that GAO can’t determine the credibility of the life-cycle cost estimate because it lacks risk and uncertainty analysis, and an independent cost estimate. He also tells Rogers that no cost-benefit analysis has been performed for the CAT/BPSS, which is also an important piece of the life-cycle costing.
Hoggan says that the Department of Homeland Security reviewed the life-cycle cost estimate for CAT/BPSS and has sent it back to TSA for adjustments, including the inclusion of a risk analysis. He says the estimate will be delivered to DHS within 30 days.
Pointing to past problems with procurement programs managed by TSA, Rogers says that while the agency has made improvements, “I am concerned that CAT/BPSS falls in to the same familiar patter of TSA procurement and completely misses the mark.” He says the program is a “quick fix” for solving a problem that TSOs are having identifying fraudulent IDs and suggest looking at “revising training standards, management protocols and operational procedures.”