The fighting between the government of Ukraine and separatists that began in 2014 resulted in the destruction of 29 radiation portal monitors worth $3.9 million that were provided by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the agency said last week.
The NNSA has no plans to replace these monitors, which are among 84 installed in Ukraine through the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) program that are no longer operated by the Ukrainian government, “as these regions are still disputed territories,” NNSA spokeswoman Francie Israeli said by email.
“However, NSDD has provided additional mobile, man-portable and handheld radiation detection equipment to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine to support operations in these regions,” Israeli said. The total cost of the destroyed monitors – at six locations in Ukraine and six locations in Crimea – is about $3.9 million, she said.
NNSA then sent the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine an emergency shipment worth approximately $2.3 million. The shipment in July 2014 of 700 personal radiation detectors cost approximately $400,000, she said; the pagers were deployed at checkpoints near Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
The Border Guards also received between June 2014 and March 2015 eight mobile detection vans worth approximately $1.6 million, five radiation detection backpacks worth about $100,000, and 63 high-sensitivity radiation pagers worth around $200,000, Israeli said.
The destroyed radiation sensors were noted in a June 17 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on challenges facing the NSDD program, which, Israeli said, has provided approximately 500 radiation portal monitors at vehicle and rail border crossings, airports, and seaports in Ukraine since 2006.
The NSDD program installs large-scale radiation detectors at border crossings, seaports, airports, and other locations worldwide in foreign nations, and offers partner countries mobile detection system equipment and training to address the threat of nuclear and radiological material smuggling. The GAO noted that 2,700 cases of illicit nuclear and radiological material trafficking were confirmed as of Dec. 31, 2014, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency database.
A report on nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine for 2015, released Wednesday by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), said the agency had lost regulatory control over areas under occupation by armed groups due to ongoing combat in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
“The largest number of industrial coal, metallurgical, chemical and mining enterprises in Ukraine, which belong to the industries of high risk and use sealed radionuclide radiation sources are located in these territories,” the report said, noting that nuclear and radiation safety control in these areas is now “almost impossible.”
The report said a steel plant discovered on its territory an abandoned container with radiation sources; the container was previously used in a private enterprise in the Luhansk region, indicating the material was trafficked. Three nuclear energy licensees also reported they could not ensure the physical protection of radiation sources because their facilities had been seized by the armed military units of the two separatist regions. The report also said Ukraine lost regulatory control over a research reactor and two subcritical assemblies in Crimea.
The SNRIU highlighted the potential threat of illicit radiation source and radioactive waste trafficking from the territory outside of Ukrainian control that could lead to “public exposure,” radioactive contamination of the environment, or creation of a radiological “dirty bomb.”
The NSDD’s efforts in partner countries are limited by economic, resource, and infrastructure constraints, in addition to political challenges, which are often outside of the program’s control, the GAO report said. Some of these issues are addressed by providing equipment to partner countries “one step” away from those areas, including at airports and seaports directly linked with the countries of concern.
For example, Russia’s phasing out of cooperative nuclear security and nonproliferation activities with the U.S. has left the status of NSDD sites in Russia unknown, the GAO report said, noting that these sites make up about 45 percent of the program’s locations. NSDD is now identifying potential smuggling pathways from Russia that it might reinforce with equipment, it said.
Israeli noted that extensive equipment damage from conflict is rare; the last time something similar occurred was in Georgia in 2008, during the country’s war with Russia over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Israeli said eight radiation portal monitors at three locations in Georgia were severely damaged during this time, and that the NSDD program spent approximately $500,000 to repair and replace this equipment.
“There, damage was less extensive and NSDD provided support for repair and refurbishment of monitors after the conflict was resolved,” Israeli said, noting that the program has provided mobile, man-portable, and handheld equipment to be used near the breakaway regions.
The Black Sea region, including parts of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, has been a hotbed of nuclear material smuggling attempts. Hundreds of nuclear trafficking incidents have been recorded in the region over the past two decades, including seizures of highly enriched uranium and radioactive isotopes in Moldova and Georgia, as well as attempted smuggling of nuclear materials out of Ukraine.
The United States and Ukraine in 2006 signed a Joint Action Plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which involves securing nuclear and radiological materials in Ukraine, enhancing the country’s border security, and building country capacity to investigate smuggling attempts.
The NSDD program had partnered with 59 countries as of last October, and spent about $1 billion from fiscal 2011 to 2015, the GAO noted. The report said NNSA plans to spend $809 million from fiscal 2017 to 2021 for the program, according to the agency’s fiscal 2017 budget request.
“NSDD does not work in active conflict zones and cannot permanently install systems at disputed or uncontrolled borders,” Israeli said. “We do work with our partners to identify the appropriate solution for these regions, typically a combination of van based, man-portable, and handheld equipment that can be used in patrols and at temporary checkpoints.”
Authorities in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, and Georgia all reported to the GAO that systems provided by the program had resulted in “multiple cases of successful detection, deterrence, and interdiction of smuggled nuclear and radiological materials.”
The GAO report said the NSDD program cannot adequately measure its progress because of shortcomings in its articulation of goals and performance measures. A 2014 program plan outlined several five-year goals, which include deploying fixed radiation portal monitors to an additional 100 sites in countries bordering Russia; installing equipment at additional seaports; supporting partner countries’ law enforcement by deploying radiation detection equipment; and preparing countries for the transition by which they would become fully responsible for the radiation detection equipment.
However, the program cannot measure its progress in achieving these goals “because not all of the goals are measurable and outcome-oriented,” the GAO found. Only the first goal of installing equipment at 100 sites near Russia is measurable, while the other three “describe actions rather than outcomes, and they do not include quantifiable or measurable end results,” the report said.
The GAO recommended the NNSA administrator develop a more detailed program plan to address these ambiguities. The agency said in response that the NSDD is expected to complete development of a comprehensive program plan with measurable program goals by the end of fiscal 2016.