Pentagon and congressional stakeholders should re-evaluate the Air Force’s decision to cancel the Global Hawk Block 30 unmanned aerial system (UAS) in favor of the legacy U-2 spy plane because the decision is based on questionable cost and capability estimates and because it is bad for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts in both the short and long terms, according to a white paper released recently.
Rebecca Grant, president of IRIS Research, said in her white paper Global Hawk Block 30 and Defense Strategy the decision to cancel Northrop Grumman’s [NOC] Block 30 is based on questionable cost and capability estimates because the Air Force was in process of reallocating several cost categories in preparation for the retirement of the U-2. As a result, she said, current Block 30 costs appear inflated with bills for base security and other line items while the U-2 costs look lower. Grant said the service also likely derived costs for each system based on adding up the number of flight hours and costs per flight hour to reach aggregate figures.
“Given the status of the data, the claims of slight differences in cost data do not appear to be a firm basis for future cost projections,” Grant said in her report.
Canceling the Block 30 is also bad for the Air Force both in the short and long terms, she said. It is bad in the short term, because it leaves the service paying for two “boutique” fleets with separate maintenance, depot and upgrade bills to pay for the U-2 and a truncated force of Global Hawks without the Block 30s. It also doesn’t make sense to spend the money producing the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS, the Navy’s version of Block 30, and not the Block 30 itself. Grant noted the Navy is moving ahead with the purchase of about 115 P-8 maritime radar surveillance planes by Boeing [BA] and 68 or more BAMS.
“As a result, the Global Hawk costs may appear higher because they are incorporating more costs elements, while the U-2 costs look lower as those same elements depart,” Grant’s report said.
Grant also said canceling the Block 30 is bad in the long run because it flies counter to the service’s new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and its long distances to cover via surveillance. She said compared to the legacy U-2 manned spy plane, which is only capable of 10-12 hour flights due to pilot endurance, the Block 30, with its 24-hour endurance record, is unquestionably the superior system to use for ISR requirements in the Defense Department’s new region of emphasis. In addition, the Block 30’s superior ISR capabilities, such as operating in Global Positioning Satellite-denied environments and capturing images of time-sensitive and dynamic ad hoc targets in under three hours, is exactly why the Air Force stationed Block 30s in Guam in 2010.
“Simply put, this unmanned capability cannot be matched by any other aircraft in the inventory because none have the endurance,” Grant said in her report.
Grant summarized her report by emphasizing the ability of the ISR force to contribute to stability and future wartime operations is what’s truly at risk. The white paper can be accessed at: http://bit.ly/K0pDZm